

**SRI AROOR SRINIVASA RAO ENDOWMENT  
LECTURES**

**DVAITA PHILOSOPHY**  
**AS EXPOUNDED BY ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA**

**B.N.K. SHARMA**



**UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS**





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ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

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LECTURES (1989-1990)

**DVAITA PHILOSOPHY**  
AS EXPOUNDED BY ŚRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA

ŚĀSTRANIDHI DVAITAVEDĀNTARASAJÑA

Dr B.N.K. SHARMA, M.A. Ph.D., D.Litt.

*Formerly Professor of Sanskrit & Ardhamagadhi,  
Ruparel College, Bombay-400 016*



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## FOREWORD

Professor B.N.K. Sharma is one of the leading philosophers who has specialised in Dvaita Philosophy. There is hardly any aspect of Madhva's philosophy to which he has not contributed significantly, and which has not been transformed by his significant works.

The present work is the outcome of his lectures delivered under "Sri Aroor Srinivasa Rao Endowment Lectureship" for 1989-90 on Dvaita Philosophy as expounded by Śrī Madhvācārya, at the Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy.

In the present volume, Professor B.N.K. Sharma examines the place of Dvaita School in Vedānta Sāstra and its progressive development. In the course of his illuminating lectures, Professor Sharma explicates the relevance of Madhva's realistic philosophy to his own times and to human progress for all time. The core of his lectures centres on the guidelines put forward by Śrī Madhva for the solution of the conflict of Advaita Śrutis with perceptual evidence and experience. This book, I am sure will be of immense interest to all researchers, scholars and all those who are interested in Philosophy in general.

With deep sense of sorrow I record that the donor of this Endowment lectures Shri Aroor Srinivasa Rao, is no more to share the joy the publication of this volume brings to all of us,

I thank my colleagues Dr. S. Panneerselvam, Dr. G. Mishra and Dr. V.K.S.N. Raghavan, Professor, Department of Vaishnavism, who have spared no pains to go through the proofs.



Finally, I thank the esteemed Vice-Chancellor, Professor P.K. Ponnuswamy for making the publication of this volume possible despite the delay caused due to unforeseen circumstances. I also thank M/s. Avvai Achukkoodam, Madras for their neat execution of the work.

Radhakrishnan Institute for  
Advanced Study in Philosophy,  
University of Madras,  
Madras-600 005.  
February 9, 1996.

T. S. DEVADOSS  
Director



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## LECTURE I

THE PLACE OF THE DVAITA SCHOOL IN  
VEDĀNTA ŚĀSTRA AND ITS PROGRESSIVE  
DEVELOPMENT

Dvaita, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are the principal schools of Vedānta presenting the widest possible points of departure emerging from the different interpretations of the triple canon of the Vedānta Śāstra. To this day they enjoy the status of living systems of Vedānta, — each with its own well-defined community of followers, religious institutions and extensive philosophical literature in Sanskrit. The Dvaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita have also the credit of having a substantial body of devotional literature in the Kannaḍa and Tamil languages, respectively, contributed by the outpourings of their Saints and Mystics.

Though chronologically the last and having perhaps less number of followers than the other two, the Dvaita school has been the chief rival in thought to the Advaita in the history of Indian Philosophy. Though the first Theistic reaction to Śaṅkara's philosophy was led by Rāmānuja and his predecessors, it is to the Dvaita school of Madhva and his followers that we have to turn for a robust and uncompromising metaphysical resistance to Monism in Vedānta and a complete vindication of Vedāntic Theism, in conformity with the oldest and the most genuine textual traditions. The total banishment of Prakṛti, or its near-banishment from the domain of the Śrutis, as "*Aśabdam*" in the earlier commentaries on the Sūtra — *Ikṣater na aśabdam* is an instance in point.

After the downfall of the Sāṅkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realisms as a result of the onslaught of the Advaita dialecticians, it is the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva that has stood up in Indian thought against all forces of idealism and acosmism. It had to fight with Monism a battle royal on its own ground during the last seven centuries. The history of this high-level



philosophical polemics have been a glorious chapter in the annals of the Vedānta. It attracted all-India attention and drew some of the best brains of the north and the south of India as participants therein. As a result of this polemics which went on in the Post-Jayatīrtha period, for nearly three centuries, the Dvaita system emerged as a front-rank philosophical system of all-India reputation, throwing even the Rāmānuja school into the shade. As Dasgupta says "the logical and dialectical thinkers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of Śāṅkara and the Mādhva school. There is hardly anyone in the whole history of the development of the Rāmānuja system whose logical acuteness could be compared with that of Śrīharṣa or Citsukha or with that of Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha" (*History of Indian Philosophy*, iii, p. 111). He has also said "In my opinion, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsatīrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian Thought" (p. VII Preface to Vol. IV).

The thinkers of the Dvaita school have made many outstanding contributions to the problems of philosophy. Their works could be studied with profit by modern minds also. The views propounded by Madhva on the nature of the Sākṣi as the apperceiving principle of validation of knowledge, on Viśeṣas, difference as "Dharmisvarūpa" clarified by its counter-correlates, unity of essence of substance and its permanent attributes, the dispensability of the Universal in favour of resemblance, the status of memory as a *Pramāṇa*, the nature of Space and Time were much in advance of his times and remarkably suggestive. Madhva's conception of creation of eternal substance also in the Pickwickian sense of *Parādhīna-Viśeṣāpti* comes very close to the Thomist conception of Eternal Creation. Vyāsatīrtha's review of the doctrines, categories and definitions of the Navya-Nyāya of the Gaṅgeśa School in his *Tarka-tāṇḍava* put a timely check on the over-growth of Formalism in Indian Logic.

The achievements of the Dvaita school far outweigh the numerical strength, influence and distribution of its followers. The Caitanya Sampradāya of Bengal derives not only its preceptual order but its doctrine of Viśeṣa, Siddhrūpā Bhakti and other tenets from Madhva thought. The Devotional Movement of the Haridāsa Kūṭa of Karnataka was a spontaneous expression of Madhva's religious philosophy in the regional language and its appeal reached the common people through the Devaranamas of



Saint-composers like Vyāsātīrtha and his disciples the famous Purandara Dāsa and Kanakadāsa. The vitality of the system can be judged from the fact that it has been able to penetrate and overcome the barriers of language and assimilate, among its followers today, speakers of seven different Indian languages.

Dvaita literature, the bulk of which is in Sanskrit, is very extensive. Much of it still remains unpublished. It falls into two great natural divisions—the works of Madhva, as many as thirty-seven in number, collectively known as *Sarvamūla*. Unlike Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, who have built their system on the foundations of the works left by their historical predecessors or forerunners of their school, Madhva had to plan, cogitate and think out every detail of his system-critically and comparatively. He had the benefit of a large body of source-materials salvaged from fading and forgotten sources, which he rescued for the benefit of posterity and which were much nearer in time to the basic canonical literature of Vedic thought than their interpretations by later-day commentators, however eminent. The period of Madhva was thus the creative period in the history of the school. The Post-Madhva period again may be split up into the period of standardisation of Dvaita thought and its all-round exposition at the hands of Jayatīrtha. Then comes the Age of Neo Dialecticism of Viṣṇudāsa and Vyāsātīrtha and the sequel to their dialectics. But Dvaita literature is not all dialectics. Its non-polemical literature is much more extensive. The tradition of peaceful constructive commentary-writing initiated by the immediate disciples of Madhva known as the *Prācīna-Tīkākāras* was resumed in the post-Vyāsātīrtha period by a host of very eminent writers including both the Heads of the several Madhva *Pīṭhas* which had come into existence in course of time and hundreds of *Gṛhastha Panditas* such as Vādirāja Svāmin, Raghūttama Tīrtha, Vijayendra Tīrtha, Sudhīndra, Rāghavendra, Raghunātha Tīrtha, Jagannātha Tīrtha, Sumatīndra Tīrtha and others and *Panditas* of the calibre of Yadupati Ācārya, Keśavācārya, Bīdarahaṇṇi Śrīnivāsa Ācārya, etc. As a result of all these the mighty tree of Madhva Siddhānta has grown to its full stature and strength, putting forth fine foliage and fragrant flowers and bearing its rich luscious fruits of philosophy, logic, theology, daring dialectics, constructive development of Siddh-



ānta, doctrinal elaboration, religious Mysticism, controversial literature commentaries, elucidations, glosses and tracts.

It is, however, very remarkable that throughout this long period of its development, there has been no rift or divergence of doctrine, within the school, as there has been in the other schools of Vedānta. The Dvaitins' sense of loyalty to the views of Madhva has been remarkably steady and consistent throughout. Even the frigid article of faith in the existence of a class of Tamoyogyas among souls has not evoked any perceptible opposition from within. But changes in emphasis on doctrines, or in the technique of their presentation, according to the exigencies of the times and contemporary thought-needs and trends and variation in modes of treatment have not been wanting.

With the growing decline of the knowledge of Sanskrit in the rank and file of the community due to the inevitable economic and other pressures in social life and the absence of a common language of communication among the followers of Madhva, living in different linguistic regions, there is a lop-sided development of literature on Dvaita philosophy in most of the other regional languages spoken by the followers of Madhva, except Kannaḍa. The revival of interest in this system in Northern India seems to be linked with the production of adequate literature on the subject in Hindi — which its appeal to the academic intelligentsia not only in this country but outside, particularly in the Western world — which still sets the pace of our thinking in many fields of Science and Technology, seems to be unquestionably with the English language. It will also help a great deal to explore the areas of rapprochement between Madhva thought and the thoughts of Western philosophy — both idealistic and realistic. Madhva himself had thrown a hint in this direction when he said —

*Anādikālato vṛttās samayā hi pravāhataḥ  
Na cocchedo'sti kasyāpi samayasya \*\*\**

If the leaders of Madhva thought among the intelligentsia would take advantage of the existing common ground of tradition between Dvaita philosophy and the Gaitanya school with its modern offshoot of the ISKCON; it may be expected to open a new chapter in the history of Vedāntic Realism of Madhva.



## THE HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE REVIVAL OF VEDĀNTIC REALISM BY MADHVA

The Vedānta system, as we know it from the Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, is the result of the harmonisation of the thought-currents of the basic literature of the Vedic, Upaniṣadic and Purāṇic ages. Its premises, arguments and conclusions were couched in such a condensed form that in course of time they came to be interpreted in many different ways, often in conflict with one another — which made it difficult to be sure where lay the truth of the original. This led to much logical argumentation among the supporters of different interpretations. The classical systems of Śaṅkara and his followers and of those who came after him, such as Bhāskara, Rāmānuja and Madhva are the outcome of such a process from different ideological standpoints. Most of the commentators had confined the Sūtrakāra's system to the classical Upaniṣads alone and had practically left the Pre-Upaniṣadic and Post-Upaniṣadic literature out of their scope. But the internal evidence of the Sūtras and the implications of the interpretation of some of the Sūtras according to the some of these older commentators themselves, tend to show that the scope of the Sūtras as originally intended by their author was much wider.

Moreover, the Upaniṣads themselves, as Dr. C Kunhan Raja has pointed out in his study of the *Asya Vāmasya Sūkta* of the Rg Veda were “mere attempts to preserve and understand the ancient tradition than a new illumination”. This is confirmed by the appeals to the authority of the pronouncements of the Ṛṣis and the spiritual experiences of Vedic seers like Vāmadeva, in the Upaniṣads on topics relating to metaphysics, cosmology, eschatology, bondage and release. In course of time, the Sūtras came to be invested with supreme authority as the Nirṇāyaka Śāstra of Vedānta philosophy. There were also in ancient India several other schools of thought which preferred to philosophise independently of the Vedic tradition and its authority. The Cārvāka, Jaina and Buddha schools stood for open thought, unfettered by Vedic and Upaniṣadic authority. They were also in revolt against the Vedic and Upaniṣadic social system and ceremonials which still held the field.



The growing popularity of the Dissenters crystallised into well-defined systems built up by acute thinkers. The early thinkers of the Buddhist schools like Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Sthīramati and the Jain thinkers and the Cārvākas posed a mighty challenge to the adherents of the Upaniṣads, who came to be called — “Aupaniṣadas”, who preferred to derive their inspiration from the textual authority of the Upaniṣads.

The defenders of the Vedic tradition allied themselves with the Mīmāṃsakas who clung to the Karmakāṇḍa. The Nityatva and Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedic heritage were logically expounded and were incorporated into the Vedānta system also. (*Śruteṣca śabdāmūlatvāt, ata eva ca nityatvam*).

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya systems stood midway between the Avaidika and the Aupaniṣada Schools. They were criticised by the Vedānta for their finite conception of the Deity, their Atheism and Agnosticism. The II Adhyāya of the Brahmasūtras has polemised upon several non-Vedāntic schools which had come into being and had acquired a hold on the minds of many seekers of Truth.

Thus the Vedānta Sūtras became the battle ground of the Aupaniṣadas against their opponents. The Karmakāṇḍa parts of the Vedic heritage had already lost much of their hold on account of their denigration by the Cārvāka, Jaina and Bauddha schools. The Vedānta tended to emphasise the importance of Jñāna and assigned a secondary role to karmakāṇḍa as conducive to mental purification.

Thus, in the beginning, Indian philosophical systems were broadly classified as Vaidika and Avaidika Darśanas according as they accepted or rejected the authority of the Vedic tradition. But this emphasis was soon shifted, on account of the powerful impact of the purely speculative stand of the Buddhistic schools — to a difference between the realistic and idealistic temperaments in philosophy. The Realistic attitude affirmed its faith in the real existence of the world its experiences and values; while the idealistic stood opposed to them. Jainism, Sāṅkhya Yoga, Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita stood strongly behind Realism.



The credit for this change of outlook and perspective must go to the Buddhist thinkers who had boldly thrown away the shackles of authority, even of the Upaniṣads and relied on pure thought to establish their views and forced the others, in course of time, to line up with the new trend and build their doctrines more on logical foundations than on revealed authority, however difficult it may be for some of them to do so, completely. Henceforward, philosophical schools which wanted to survive had to make use of the weapon of logic and dialectics in order to justify themselves or else to quit the field.

The dialectical weapon was most ably and dexterously handled by the Vijñānavāda in favour of an idealistic interpretation of the external world. This gave an impetus to the Nihilistic school of Buddhism also. The Idealistic and the Nihilistic schools of Buddhist Logic converged on one point — the over-throwing of the belief in the existence of a real external universe. The Buddhist onslaught fell heavily on the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsa Schools of realism of the day. Later, the Advaita made common cause with the Buddhist idealism and Nihilism in undermining the foundations of realistic metaphysics. (*Brahmabhinne śūnyavādidbhir asmākam sāmāyam iṣṭam* [Siddhi Vyākhyā] ).

The hold of Dialecticism on Indian philosophy proper thus begins with the struggle between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā Realisms with Buddhist Idealism and Nihilism. The most eminent thinkers of the Buddhist and the Brahminical persuasions took part in this controversy. There are recorded instances of several Brahmin scholars, who were always open to conviction, having renounced their Vedic faith and embraced Buddhism and devoted their talents to the advancement of Buddhist metaphysics. The names of the participants on either side bear sufficient testimony to their mettle — These can be gathered from any History of Indian Philosophy.

The combined onslaught of the Realistic Schools seems ultimately to have made it difficult for Buddhism to thrive on the Indian soil and it had in the end to quit. The downfall of Buddhism meant the triumph of Realism over Idealism and Acosmism on the philosophical front.



But the place of Buddhistic Idealism and Acosmism was soon taken up by a fresh entrant into the philosophical scene — the Advaita Vedānta. The earliest Advaita dialectician to boost Idealism and Acosmism was Gauḍapāda. Mystery surrounds his personality. Some scholars have held that he was a Buddhist in the beginning and later turned Vedāntin. However that may be, there is clear evidence of his having been very much influenced by the negative dialectics of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva and the 'Ajātivāda' (no world-causation theory). As Prof. R. D. Karmarkar has openly confessed, "Gauḍapāda makes use of phraseology strongly reminiscent of Buddhistic schools and he modelled his Kārikās on those of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. The main doctrines taught in the IV Chapter of Gauḍapāda are the unreality of the world and Śūnyatā, respectively held by the Vijñānavādins and the Mādhyamikas. The three kinds of Jñāna and two kinds of 'Satyam' (or three) are all Buddhistic ideas and were borrowed from Buddhist writers. The use of a large number of Buddhistic terms like *Advaya*, *adhvaṇ* (time), *Tāyin*, *dharmadhātu*, *Nāyaka*, *nimittaka*, *Vaiśārāḍya*, *Saṅghāta*, *Samvṛti*, the simile of the *Alāta*, the magic elephant — all these show Gauḍapāda was obsessed by Buddhistic ideas which he taught in the IV Prakaraṇa of his work."

In establishing his idealism as against Realism, Gauḍapāda relied more on logical argument and dialectics than on scriptural authority. In fact, he even says the Śrutis are to be accepted only if they do not go against the conclusions arrived at by reasoning.

*Niścitam yuktīyuktam ca  
Yat tat bhavati netarat*" (3.23)

Though he makes passing references to certain Śruti texts like *Indro māyābhikṣ* and *Neha nānāsti* he hardly enters into the interpretation of the Upaniṣads in the light of his ideas. And he has completely ignored the Brahmasūtras — the stronghold of realism and Theism in Vedānta. These tasks were taken up by his grand-disciple Śaṅkarācārya.

But Śaṅkara himself had formulated his system only in mere outlines and had left it incomplete in many respects and had not provided clear and satisfactory answers to many problems



he himself had raised in trying to explain his system.<sup>1</sup> This led to a wide divergence of opinion among his followers on several crucial problems and doctrines of Advaita metaphysics. Some of these were set forth and sought to be harmonised by Appayya Dikṣita in his *Siddhāntaleśa Samgraha*.

### THE CREATIVE AGE OF MADHVA

Madhva's system represents the final phase of the main points of departure in the Vedānta system on the issues of Theism Vs Monism and Acosmism and Realism. He appeared on the Indian philosophical scene after the systems of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja had been well-established. He did not feel satisfied with their interpretations of Vedāntic thought with particular reference to the basic traditions and wanted to propound a new system of his own. This was the result of his own critical study of the scriptural legacy and the prevailing schools and his own cogitations on them. The reasons which led him to formulate his new Darśana were thus his doctrinal differences with contemporary trends and schools, in and outside Hinduism and particularly with that of Śaṅkara which was then the dominant philosophy of the times. In spite of the powerful theistic reaction led by Rāmānuja against Śaṅkara Vedānta, Madhva could not see eye to eye with him on many points of Theistic doctrine and traditions. He, therefore, felt called upon to give a new lead to his countrymen.

### MADHVA'S PART IN THE RECLAMATION OF OUR ANCIENT LITERARY LEGACY

Centuries back, Ācārya Madhva took upon himself the arduous task of a modern Research Scholar of discovering and reclaiming forgotten and fading source books of Tattva Śāstra including the great Epic. He refers in his *Mbh T.N.* to his untiring search for MSS of the Epic for purposes of collation in fixing the standard text

*Deśe deśe tathā granthau dṛṣṭvā caiva prthak vidhau*

He is also the first to throw new light on the enigmatic verse

1. Critique of Madhva Refutation of Śaṅkara School of Vedānta - Dr. K. Narain. p-7



*Manvādi bhāratam kecid āstikādi tathāpare  
Tathāparicarādyanye bhāratam pravadanti hi*

as representing the three distinct approaches to the understanding of the Gestalt of the Epic, from the historical or narrative, the moral and ethical and the philosophical perspectives. The General Editor of the Critical Edition of the Mahābhārata by the BORI, Pune, the late Dr. Sukthankar has paid a handsome tribute to Madhva for this lead.

The work of reclamation of ancient MSS. did not stop with those of the Epic. It embraced a far wider area of Śāstra works. This is clear from the astonishingly large number of authoritative source books, not now extant, from which citations have been made by him beginning with his earliest work — the *Gītābhāṣya* and carrying on the work of reclamation afterwards also. A curious fact confirms this that one such work the *Brahma tarka* from which more than 500 passages have been found quoted in his subsequent works, is not mentioned in his *Gītābhāṣya*, but only in his *Gītā Tātparya* which was a subsequent work of later date. Anyone who goes through his commentaries on the Upaniṣads, the Brahmasūtras and Prakaraṇas will be impressed by the plethora of sources from which he quotes in corroboration of his views from Vedic, Post-Vedic and Purāṇic sources, Lexicons, Khila Śrutis, grammatical tags, Niruktas and rare Samhitās of the Pāncarātra. Leaving aside the extant sources, there are no less than 290 non-extant sources from which citations are found. It is, therefore, very unfortunate that instead of appreciating this yeoman service of this great Jñānopāsaka, in the highly disturbed socio-religious and political atmosphere of the times in which he lived and stood for the rehabilitations of Vedic Dharma at great personal risk, some later day critics like Appayya Dīkṣita should have been uncharitable enough to mistrust his *bona fides* and accuse him of having fabricated all of them.

#### MADHVA'S INFLUENCE ON OTHER SCHOOLS

The Post-Madhva Vaiṣṇava schools of Nimbārka, Vallabha and Caitanya have come under the influence of Madhva. Though Nimbārka has been classed as a Bhedābhedavadin, ostensibly, his clarification of what he means by *bheda* and *abheda* between Jīva



and Brahman, as being equally true, virtually comes to the same thing as Madhva's view, — though his way of phrasing them is different. For, according to Nimbārka, difference means dependence of the Jīva on Brahman while identity means lack of independent existence and functioning on the part of the Jīva (See *Ghate, the Vedānta*, p. 29). This is nothing new to Madhva who has clearly stated in his *Gītā Bhāṣya* itself "What is dependent on another is sometimes said to be one with it, in spite of the Real differences between them, in essence. Everything is said to be Brahman in the sense that everything in finite reality is dependent on Brahman for its existence, intelligence and functioning capacity but not in the sense of Brahman participating in the essence of every finite entity. Thus, the Bhedābheda Siddhānta of Nimbārka is nothing more than a high sounding term falling in the final analysis, within the scope of Madhva's position.

*Tattāntratvād aitadātmyam  
Yadadhinā yasya sattā tat tadityeva cocyate  
Vidyamāne vibhedeṣu mitho neyam svarpataḥ*

Nimbarka's interpretation of the *Utpatyadhikaraṇa* of the *Brahmasūtras* follows Madhva in explaining it as a refutation of the Śākta system and not of the *Pāncarātra*. Unlike other commentators, Madhva has designated the second Pāda of the *Sādhana Adhyāya* of the *Brahmasūtras* as *Bhakti Pāda* and has cogently explained every *adhikaraṇa* of that Pāda so as to highlight the need for *Bhakti*. Though Nimbārka has not followed Madhva in interpreting all those *adhikaraṇas*, his opening statement —

*Bhaktiyutkarṣasiddhaye tadguṇāśca ucyante*

deserves to be compared with Madhva's more outspoken statement —

*Bhaktir asmin pāde ucyate  
Bhaktiyartham Bhagavanmahimoktiḥ.*

In this Pāda, *Bhakti* is taught — that is to say the Majesty of God is explained in various *adhikaraṇas* to kindle the light of *Bhakti* in the heart of the seeker of Brahman.

Madhva's influence on Vallabha can be seen in the way in which the latter has raised the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* to the status of



a fourth Prasthāna and commenting on it. And Madhva is the first Vaiṣṇava Sampradāyācārya to write a *Tātparya* on the *Bhāgavata* and quote profusely from it in his works. The distinction admitted by Vallabha in Mokṣa between the fruits of Jñānamārga rests squarely on the presence of Tāratamya between Jīvas in the final state or what Vallabha calls *Phalaprāptau Vaiṣamyam*. Vallabha has also quoted one verse of Madhva from his *Aṇubhāṣya* — in his own commentary on the Brahmasūtras called *Aṇubhāṣya*, without acknowledgement.

The influence of Madhva's philosophy has been most prominent and pronounced on the Caitanya school of Bengal Vaiṣṇavism. The growth of this influence can be traced in the works of Rūpa Gosvami Sanātana and Jīva Gosvami. It reached its zenith in the writings of Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa in his *Govindabhāṣya* on the Brahmasūtras, which is heavily indebted to Madhva's. Baladeva's teacher Radhādāmodara also bases his exposition of his Vaiṣṇava Theism on Madhva's teachings. The doctrine of Viśeṣas which is the pivot of Madhva's ontological theory has been taken over bodily from Madhva's philosophy and from the works of Vyāsātīrtha by Radhādāmodara himself and his disciple. The Guruparamparā of the Caitanya school is traced to Madhva through Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha and this has been accepted by Prabhupāda the founder of the Western offshoot of the Caitanya school — the ISKCON which may help to bring these two closer for the benefit of international understanding of the place of Madhva in Vedānta thought. Baladeva describes himself as a follower of Caitanya who had been initiated into the Madhva order— *Athātmanah Madhvānvayadikṛta bhagavat-Kṛṣṇacaitanya-matastatvānnāha*.

His *Prameyaratnāvali* expounds the nine tenets of Madhva philosophy and pays reverential homage to Madhva in a highly poetic simile in which he says Madhva's *Tattvaavāda* has won his heart:

*Anandatīrthaplutam acyutam me  
Caitanyabhāṣvatprabhayā atiphullam  
Ceto'aravindam priyatāmarandam  
Pibatyalis sacchavi tattvaavādaḥ*



### RELEVANCE OF MADHVA'S REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY TO HIS OWN TIMES AND TO HUMAN PROGRESS FOR ALL TIME

The 13th century which saw the birth of Madhva was a period of grave cultural unrest and political turmoil in Indian history. The Hindu kingdoms and the people were passing through a catastrophic period, faced with the grim prospect of loss of political sovereignty and religious freedom. Disunion was rampant among the Hindu kingdoms. They were torn by internecine wars even in the face of a common danger to their collective security. Destruction of temples and monasteries and forcible conversions to an alien faith were going on. Higher philosophy among the Hindu intelligentsia was suffocated by a barren intellectualism of Naiṣkarmyavāda leading to Karma-Sannyāsa as the end and aim of human life. It was time to call a halt to Māyāvāda, Niṣkriyātmavāda and Naiṣkarmyavāda, leading to an unconscious pessimism of the spirit of man. Madhva felt these to be highly detrimental to the political future of his countrymen. Māyāvāda could not give the people the necessary urge to unite to resist external aggression at the most critical juncture in the country's history. Acosmism and indulgence in the hair-splitting logic of Sada-sadvilakṣaṇatva and Saptabhaṅgī were not the need of the hour. The Hindu community had to be roused to a sense of grim reality of the world and the stability of Dharma from the soporific effects of a world-negating philosophy which in one form or another of Sūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda or Māyāvāda had been devitalising the nation from the intellectuals to the masses slowly but steadily. The truth of this has been pointed out in no uncertain terms regarding its far-reaching effect on the national character and morals, by Swami Anand in his recent work: *Path of the Saints — As the Fulfilment of Vedānta* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Bombay, 1977) saying that "the greatest harm done to Hinduism by Śaṅkara was the theory of Māyā to explain away everything in the world or life as unreal and Brahman alone as the reality. This dangerous doctrine has been the greatest weakness of Hinduism and has been responsible more than anything else as a single factor throughout subsequent ages for the hypocrisy to be found generally in the nature of an average Hindu". (p. 41-42).

With a prophetic vision, Madhava rose to strengthen the national character by turning it back to the buoyant realism of



the Vedas, the true Theism of the Upaniṣads and the emotional inspiration of the Epics and Purāṇas. He wanted to give his countrymen a renewed faith in active Theism in which man will act to justify his existence and his God-given assets to work for realising his optimum Yogyatā as an instrument of the Universal Ruler.

*Kuru bhuñkṣva ca karma nijam niyatam  
Haripādavinamradhiyā satatam. (Dvādaśa Stotra)*

Drawing his materials and inspiration from the Epic, he has idealised Bhimasena as the exemplar of *Suddha Bhāgavata-Dharma* wedded to *Kṣātradharmā* — “*Nārāyaṇadvit-tadanubāndhinigrahaḥ kṣatriyāṇām viśesataḥ paramo dharmah*”. Attention is invited in this connection to the primary importance of *Yātna* in realising one's Yogyata in the interlocution of Draupadi and Bhīma with Yudhiṣṭhira on the wisdom of *no war*, at any cost, with the Kauravas. The place of honour assigned by Madhva to Bhimasena as the chief instrument of *Bhūbhāraharaṇa* in the drama of the Epic is fully supported by the internal evidence of the Epic cited by him. Similarly, to clear the misunderstanding about *Idol* worship, which attracted the fury of the invaders, he opposed the logic of *Pratīkopāśana*, in terms of identification of the inanimate images with God and the superimposition of the idea of God on them and explained that the intended sense of the Śrutis is that the Supreme Being is to be worshipped as *being present in the symbol or Pratīka* but not as identical with it. The incident narrated in his biography of his meeting the Sultan of Delhi, when he (Madhva) was crossing the Ganga at a time when hostilities were on and explaining to him his message of Universal Theism in his own language in terms which could not but impress his Muslim conscience —

*To'sau devo viśvadvipakṣaḥ pradīptaḥ  
Kurmas sarvaṃ tatparānugraheṇa.*

bears witness to his moral courage and spiritual stature. His doctrine of the One Supreme Being as the bearer of the names of the multiplicity of the gods of the Hindu pantheon in the fullest and highest primary sense of those names *To devānām nāmadhā eka eva (Rg Veda) iti eva śabdāt nānyeṣāṃ sarvanāmātā* carries the potential seed of a Universal Monotheism when the world is ready for it.



The greatest contribution of Madhva to the theory and practice of the true Karma Yoga of the *Gītā* lies in his elucidation of its true nature as identical with Niṣkāma Karmayoga of which Jñānins are the best exemplars.

It is in this context that Madhva strongly opposed the equation of Nivṛttakarma of the Śāstras in popular as well as learned quarters with Karmasannyāsa and Sanyāsa Āśrama and restored its identity with the Niṣkāmakarmayoga of the *Gītā* — on the authority of the *Vyāsa Smṛti* (and *Manu Smṛti*).

*Niṣkāmam jñānapūrvam tu nivṛttam iha cocyate.*

He also established that Arjuna to whom the message of *Niṣkāmakarmayoga* has been conveyed is nothing short of an Uttama Adhikāri, who has been called upon to adhere to it as an “*Adhikārika*” (specially chosen as a Jñāni to lead others). Madhva has thus anticipated Tilak centuries back in his estimation of Arjuna and the message of Energyism of the *Gītā*. The Ācārya is also the first to coin and use the expressive term *Jñānottara karma* (performance of karma after enlightenment) — which has found its way into the thoughts of the Saints of the Vārkarī Sampradāya of Maharashtra.

Apart from having fulfilled the needs of his times, Madhva's Realistic philosophy is relevant at all times for Universal human welfare and progress. Without faith in the reality of the world in which we live, move and have our being and its moral, ethical, aesthetic and other values of justice, fairplay, sanctity of human rights among developing nations, discharging of one's obligations to society and the country, discarding of sloth, indolence and pessimism would all be impossible. The result would be chaos all round, without Realism. A Theistic Realism with God as the moral Governor of the Universe — *Śāśvatadharma-goptā* provides an inbuilt check against anti-social propensities and exploitation of the weak by the strong, by the taming, sobering influence of religion and Ethics. All this would be impossible in any philosophy which deprives the human self of its very incentive to act by taking away from it the power to do and enjoy the fruits of its honest efforts and dismissing them as the merest superimposition of beginningless ignorance of the *true nature* of the self. No wonder our new Government is thinking of making the right to work a fundamental right in our Constitution.



## LECTURE II

THE LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS OF MADHVA'S  
PHILOSOPHY

Indian Philosophy reached its culmination in the Vedānta and its fulfilment in Madhva's Dvaita Darśana.

पूर्वःपूर्वः पूर्वपक्षो यावन्मध्वमतोदयः ।

अन्ते सिद्धस्तु सिद्धान्तो मध्वस्यागम एव हि ॥

This statement of Vādirāja in his *Tukṭimallikā* is not to be understood as being oblivious of the existence of Post-Madhva Systems of Vedānta such as those of Nimbārka, Śrīkaṇṭha and Vallabha. What is meant is that their viewpoints are either subsumable under one or the other of the earlier systems or are covered by their criticism in the standard works of the Dvaita system.

The Dvaita schools known to Gauḍapada and Śaṅkara were chiefly those of the Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya, Seśvara Sāṅkhya (Yoga) and the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. The Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya was frankly atheistic while the place given to Iśvara in the Seśvara Sāṅkhya or Yoga was that of an auxiliary or common cause of cosmic development. In all these systems, matter and souls, time and space or atoms were all independent principles. None of these systems has striven to establish God, Iśvara or Brahman as the *Only Independent Reality*, in the sense of being *Ekam Eva Advītiyam*.

In this statement *Ekam* affirms that it is the Chief or Independent Reality. *Eva* rules out all internal differences within its bosom or between itself and its attributes of consciousness, bliss, power, activity and manifestations. '*Advītiyam*' rules out the possibility of any other second Independent Principle equal or superior to it. Prof. V.B. Inamdar (*Homage to Dr. T.G. Mainkar*,



Bombay, 1982) has contended that this interpretation (cannot be accepted as it) is "unknown to any commentator before Madhva." The Professor is not properly informed on this point, for even two hundred and fifty years before Madhva, Yāmunācārya, in his *Siddhitraya* has offered the same interpretation.

The clear pronouncement in the Upaniṣad — *Nityonityānām* (the eternal of the eternal) stands committed to the acceptance of many eternal entities besides Brahman. While accepting the eternality of more than one Tattva or Prameya, Madhva holds that only one of them, viz. God or Brahman is to be accepted as the Independent Being and all the rest of finite reality as dependent on It. The concepts of independence and dependence in philosophy has been defined in Dvaita as : *Svarūpa-pramiti-pravṛtti-rūpa-sattātraividhye parānapēkṣam svatantram tadapekṣam asvatantram.*

The *Svatantra* is that Principle which does not depend on any other (principle) for its essential nature, its power of knowing or becoming known and its power to act as it deems fit while the Dependent is the one that depends on the other in all those respects. This anticipates and answers very closely to Spinoza's definition of Substance as the *res completa* — what is complete in itself, capable of existing by itself and of being explained entirely by itself."

The *Paratantra* is *ex hypothesi* dependent on another in all these three aspects. The question how one or more than one eternal entity or principle can be conceived to be dependent on another such eternal is answered by pointing out that it would be limiting the power of God or Brahman to hold that it can exercise control *only* over entities or beings which are *not* eternal and cannot have such control over others which are eternal and uncreated. How else could we explain the Upaniṣadic pronouncement *Ya ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmānam antaro yamayati* (*Brh. Up.*) "who being present in the uncreated eternally existing individual self controls him from within". The existence of many other eternal principles in the Universe such as Time and Space is also established by reason and revelation. We have, therefore, to accept it and reconcile it with the concept one *Svatantra* — Brahman. It is *not* difficult to do so — as some try to make out. That there exist at least two such eternal principles besides the Supreme



Being, which are subject to it is clearly spelt out in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* — *Jñā-ajñāu dvau iśānīṣau kṣarātmāvīṣate deva ekaḥ*, The famous verse of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*:

*Dravyam karma ca kālaśca svabhāvo jīva eva ca |*  
*Yadanugrahasanti na santiyadupekṣayā ||*

which is often quoted by Madhva, speaks clearly of the eternal dependence of eternal principles like Jīva, Time, the intrinsic nature of substances, etc. on the eternal Will and pleasure of God. The continued existence of Souls in all the three periods of Time along with the Supreme Being (Kṛṣṇa) has been articulated at the very outset of the *Gitopadeśa* (*Natvevāham jātu nāsam ...*). The counter-hypothesis of the creation of the Souls in time would at once expose them to impermanence as what is created and has a beginning must have an end. If God can confer future immortality on them He could as well have willed them to exist without a beginning and an end. That apart, the hypothesis of creation of Jīvas *de novo* and *ex nihilo* would expose God to the charges of partiality and pitilessness in putting them in different places of high and low, in happiness or misery with unequal opportunities and endowments, for no fault of theirs.

Reality presents to the inquiring mind three primary data, the thinking selves, the world of external reality and indications, or intimations of an Infinite power existing above and beyond the self and the not-self. An unbalanced exaltation of any one of these data over the rest is a source of much false philosophy. The more pretensions philosophies of ancient and modern times which have tried to resolve these three data into one have failed miserably in the end and have ended up in Materialism, Pantheism or Solipsism or have been forced to make compromises or concede some sort of conditional or phenomenal reality, through the back-door. The function of philosophy, aided by reason and experience, is to determine by what relationship of these three data, man's spiritual progress and needs can be really and fully satisfied. These three data have been designated in Vedānta Philosophy as *bhoktā*, *bhogyā* and *Preritā* or Jīva, Jaḍa and Īśvara. Madhva's philosophy reduced them to an ontological classification of two minimum number of principles — the independent and the dependent, whence his philosophy derives its name of "Dvaita." In broader outline, this different itself is expressed in five-fold form of difference among the three data



difference among Jaḍas, themselves and Jīvas, as well. This five-fold difference is termed *Pra-pañca* — the important essential five — the importance consisting in the knowledge of the five-fold distinction being conducive to the attainment of Mokṣa (*Prakṛṣṭaḥ pañcavidho bhedaḥ prapañcaḥ Prakṛṣṭatā ca mokṣopayogijñānāṅgatvena* — J).

Calm reflection will show that Madhva's classification of the reals into two grades of Svatantra and Paratantra is philosophically both purposeful and meaningful. Philosophy is interested in a quest, *not merely* of the number of ultimate reals but of their status — as a science of values. The classification of this status on grounds of Satya and Mithyā does not satisfy Madhva as it does great violence to experience. While it is true that philosophy must distinguish between appearance and reality, it is still more necessary and important for it to realise the distinction between what is Svatantra and what is Paratantra in reality. The description of Brahman in the Upaniṣads as *Satyasya satyam* indicates, according to Madhva, the saving truth is to be realised in terms of the *Svatantra* and *Paratantra* satyas. If there is only one *Satya* in existence, the talk of the real of the reals would make no sense. The proposition would otherwise have to be worded as *Asatyasya satyam* — the real of the unreals! As Jayatīrtha says, it is only when the dependent realities are realised as being dependent for thier *sattā*, *pratīti* *pravṛtti* on the One Independent Being that knowledge contributes to the highest good. Otherwise, the enumeration of Tattvas in any philosophy and their classification into positive and negative, sentient and insentient eternal and non-eternal would be waste of time and energy from the point of view of Puruṣārtha, like the counting of the sands on the bank of the Gangā, instead of bathing in its waters. These are profound words of wisdom worth pondering by all philosophers. It is the dependence of the *Paratantra* (finite reality) on the One *Svatantra* that is expressed in the history of the cosmos through its creation, sustenance, dissolution, control, ignorance and enlightenment and bondage and release of souls. Of these only as many dispensations as are compatible with each case should be taken as intended and not all for all. *Jñāna* and *Ajñāna*, *Bandha* and *Mokṣa* are obviously inapplicable to insentient reals.



Madhva's Philosophy is in agreement with the position of other Theists that the states of bondage and release are both of them real states of experience of the selves. This is *not* acceptable to Śaṅkara to whom both of them are unreal states. Madhva refuses to accept the doctrine of Paramasāmya of Jivas and Brahman in the released state, advocated by Rāmānuja (in respect of their (*ānanda*) as it infringes on Brahman's *svātantrya*. The concept of *Svātantrya* carries with it the idea of its *incomparability* in any respect with anything else in the universe. Paramasāmya in any respect would be repugnant to it.

Śaṅkara starts his philosophy with the uncriticisable certainty of the existence of the self. Madhva also starts from the same point of the self and its status as the Sākṣi or the validating principle of one's *anubhava*. Sākṣi is the apperceiving principle behind all knowledge and its validation. It is never open to error. Its judgments are always veridical and must be so. Knowledge gained through sensory channels inference and śabda-pramāṇa may sometimes go wrong — as it is interpreted by the mind. Sākṣi-pratyakṣa on the other hand is supra-mental and is caitanyātmaka jñāna, and is as such veridical.

*Mānase darśāne doṣās syur na vai sāksidarśane*

*Yatkimcid vyabhicāri syāt darśanam mānāsam tu tat*

Without the seal of validation of knowledge by the Sākṣi it would be impossible to distinguish between the true and the false. The vivid experiences of happiness and misery, desire, hatred, fright and such other inner experiences and *self awareness*, come under the purview of Sākṣi. It is the Sākṣi that has got to be accepted as intuiting the blissful nature of the self in *Suṣupti*, as the sense organs and the mind are at rest there. This intuitive experience of the bliss of *Suṣupti* is never contradicted and it establishes the uncontradictable veracity of the judgement of the Sākṣi. If the verdict of Sākṣi is impugned in any single instance the whole basis of rational existence will collapse. The entire superstructure of Logic and Philosophy, religion and science will be blown up to nothingness, as by an atom bomb, the moment we dare to question or doubt the verdict of the Sākṣi. The stage of Parikṣā or critical examination of perceptual knowledge precedes the operation of the Sākṣi.



*Na parikṣaṇaveśthā syāt sākṣisiddher tvasaṃśayāt*

Sākṣi is another name for the direct perceiver (*Sākṣad drāṣṭr*). Through the agency of the *svaṛūpaviśeṣa* it is also spoken of as the *caitanyendriya* of the self, though the two are not different in essence.

An illusionist cannot be sure of anything. For whether a given experience is true or false is to be adjudged by the Sākṣi, in the last analysis. If the Sākṣi is also a tainted principle there will be no prospect of certainty. The Sākṣipratyakṣa has therefore to be accepted as indubitable. Madhva makes a distinction between *Vṛttijñāna* or knowledge obtained through the mind interpreting sensory knowledge and intuitive perception of the Sākṣi. The former may sometimes be erroneous. The perception by the Sākṣi can never err. And it is on the rock of Sākṣyanubhava that Dvaita philosophy builds its doctrine of the reality of the world and its experience of the joys and sorrows of life.

*Asmābhir api duḥkhādibandhasya  
Satyatāyām sākṣipratyakṣam eva  
upanyastam iti hṛdayam (NS)*

There is a grave misconception in many quarters that Madhva realism stakes its all on sense perception which is not invariably valid, as proved by cases of erroneous perceptions of the snake in the rope type. This is very naive. Madhva has made it crystal clear in his writings that error is possible only in *Vṛttijñāna* but never in Sākṣyanubhava.

*Mānase darśane doṣaḥ syur  
na vai sākṣidarśane*

The truth of the Advaitasākṣātkāra supposed to be taught in the Śruti has also to be certified by the Sākṣi by sublating the earlier Sākṣyanubhava of the reality of bondage. If one Sākṣyanubhava can sublimate another, the sublating *anubhava* may likewise be open to sublation by still another and there will be no finality then.

The Upaniṣads had been interpreted by Śaṅkara and his followers in a Monistic way. Being the earliest in the field, their writings had created the impression in the minds of people that whatever may be the teachings of the *Brahmasūtras* and



the *Gītā Upaniṣads* as such were unquestionably Monistic and Advaitavāda was hailed as the true Aupaniṣadam Darśanam.

In the interest of the resuscitation of the original Theism of the Upaniṣads which were but a continuation of the Vedic philosophy and its illumination, Ācārya Madhva had to correct this impression and reveal the true trend of the teaching of the Upaniṣads by writing fresh commentaries on them and bring into bold relief their Theistic foundation and superstructure.

In the history of thought it has often happened that particular texts have come to be victimised by a dominant line of interpretation which has for long afterwards prevented critics and commentators from venturing to place them in their proper perspective. The Upaniṣads had suffered the same fate at the hands of Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and others who have side-tracked their philosophy into an investigation of the true nature of the Pratyagātman or the individual self and the rediscovery and affirmation of its essential identity with the Universal Self or Paramātman.

This excessive preoccupation of these early Monistic Vedāntins with the individual self and its affirmation as the terminus of all philosophical quest and its fulfilment as the *summum bonum* of spiritual life is the result of a gross error of judgement that in its true original and highest primary sense the term Ātman which is so often used in the Upaniṣads stands mainly and as a rule for the individual self as the real subject of philosophical quest and realisation. The Ātman-Brahman equation of the Advaita school (*Ātma ca brahma*) is the result of this unproved assumption. How persistent and alluring has been the fascination which this facile hypothesis of traditional Monistic commentators of the Upaniṣads has exercised on the imagination of modern Indian scholars and Western savants who were guided mostly by the literal sense of the passages without caring to go into the context or the significance of the analogies used there may be seen from the assertion made by Dr. Radhakrishnan in the Introduction to his translation of the *Principal Upaniṣads*, that "in the early prose Upaniṣads 'Ātman' is the principle of individual consciousness and Brahman the superpersonal ground of the cosmos. Soon the distinction diminishes and the two are identified." (p.77).



But when one investigates the matter seriously one finds that the term *Ātman* as used in the higher contexts of its occurrence in the *Upaniṣads* such as pertain to the genesis of the cosmos and its evolution and the goal of man, it does not stand for the individual self as such. In the light of this finding, the whole foundation and superstructure of *Advaita metaphysics* tumbles down.

Madhva has helped disinterested students of the *Upaniṣads* to take a fresh look at them from a correct perspective. The basic misconception of the individual self in its isolation, being the subject of study and realisation has practically deposed God or the Supreme Brahman from its rightful place of honour in the heart of the *Upaniṣads* as the *Aupaniṣadah puruṣaḥ*. There is good reason to believe that the term *Ātman* in its plenary and highest primary sense has been used even in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* in the sense of the "*Antaryāmi*" or indwelling energiser of the whole of sentient and insentient reality. The solemn refrain: *Eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi amṛtaḥ* of *Yājñavalkya* occurring nearly twentyone times in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* should open our eyes to this fact. In the II Valli of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* we have a description of the Evolution of life from Brahman. Prefacing the description with the words: The knower of Brahman, attains the supreme goal. Brahman is *satyam jñānam anantam* the *Śruti* tells us that "From the aforesaid *Ātman* was born *Ākāśa*, from *Ākāśa* *Vāyu*, *Agni* from *Vāyu* and so on. *Tasmād vā etasmād ātmana ākāśas sambhūtāḥ*. Since the *Jīvātman* has not been referred to earlier, the pronoun *tasmād etasmad (ātmanah)* has necessarily to refer to Brahman spoken of as in the beginning and defined as *Satyam jñānam anantam*. A careful study of such crucial contexts discussed by Madhva would make it clear that the quest of the *Vedānta* has always been directed towards the Supreme Being which is the *Antaryāmi* of both the *Jaḍa* and *Cetana prapañca* and not toward the individual self who is always the seeker and never the sought. The next section will make this clear.

## THE TRUE IDENTITY OF THE

### 'AUPANIṢADAH PURUṢAḥ'?

In principle and in substance, the classical *Upaniṣads* are totally committed to *Brahmavidyā* — the science of all sciences



(*Sarvavidyāpratiṣṭhā*). For this reason they are also called 'Adhyātmavidyā'. The term 'Ātman' here signifies the Supreme Ruler of all finite existence, its indwelling controller called *Antaryāmī* in the *Bṛh. Up.* The prefix *adhi* signifies transcendence of rulership (*adhir īṣvare*) Pāṇini. 1-4-97 This Being is also referred to as the (*Aupanishadaḥ*) *Puruṣaḥ* — in the same sense — *Sa vā ayam Puruṣaḥ sarvāsu purṣu puriṣayaḥ*.

Thus, the terms *Puruṣa* and *Ātman* have been used in the highest etymological connotation primarily for the Supreme Being and only in a conventional sense of worldly usage to refer to the embodied self. It is to mark off the conventional usage from the true philosophical sense that the *Gītā* speaks of the Supreme Being as *Uttamāḥ Puruṣaḥ* and *Parama Ātma*. According to the principle of interpretation *Mukhyāmukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyaḥ* the highest Primary sense of terms is entitled to precedence in *Śāstravicāra*.

The question is raised by *Yudhiṣṭhira* in the *Mokṣadharmā Parva* of the *Mbh.* put to *Bhīṣmācārya* — Sir, are there many *Puruṣas* or only one? *Bhīṣma* answers O King, the *Sāmkhya* and *Yoga* thinkers accept the existence of many *Puruṣas*. But they do not accept the existence of One Supreme *Puruṣa* above them. I shall, therefore, tell you about that Supreme *Puruṣa* who is of infinite attributes (*guṇādhikam*) and the source of sustenance (*yonī*) of all others *Puruṣas*. He is the indwelling Ruler in you and in me and all embodied selves.

तथातं पुरुषं.....

*Tava antarātmē mama ca*

*Ye cānye dehasamsthitaḥ*

*Madhva* makes use of this pronouncement in the *Mokṣadharmā* by pointing out in his *Dvādaśastotra* that this disposes of the theory that the difference between the *Jīvas* and *Brahman* is only a *Vyāvahārika-bheda* and not a true one:

*Vyavahārabhidāpi guror jagatām*

*Na tu cittagatā sa hi codyā param I*

*Bahavaḥ Puruṣāḥ Puraṣāpravarā*

*Haririty avadat svayam eva Hariḥ II*

the words of the *Gītā* —



*Uttamaḥ Puruṣatvanyah Paramātmetyadahṛtaḥ  
Yo lokatryam aviśya bibhartavyaya Iśvarah*

reinforces the content of meaning of the words —

*Bahūnām puruṣaṇām yonih, Guṇādhikah  
Tavāntarātmā mama ca ye cānye dehasamsthītāḥ*

While the Mantras and Brāhmanas of the Vedic literature deal with God or Brahman, apparently as an External Being, the Āraṇyakas turn their attention to its immanence in the universe: (*Etam hyeva Bahvā... etam agnau, etam āditye ... sarveṣu bhūtesu etam eva Brahmetyācakaṣṭe*). The sources of man's spiritual insight are both subjective and objective, the light of the Self within and the wonders of the world without. In the Samhitās the vast order and movement of nature called *ṛtam* from *Ṛ* to move, or develop, holds the attention. The Upanisads turn to explore the inner world of man (Kath. V.1). From the external physical world the attention is here shifted to the inner immortal self of man and its states of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep (*susupti*) and beyond and its relation to the Supreme Unseen Power which steers it in and through these states (See *Brh, Up.* IV.3.15 and *BS III 2*). The Supreme of the Upanisads is thus the God in Man in the Universe and is beyond both at the same time or what has been described in the *Puruṣa Sūkta* as the highest of all-in the Universe. *Viśvataḥ Paramam nityam*. Madhva finds this sentiment voiced in the words of the B.S. *Bhūmā samprasādāt adhyupadēśa-* the expression *adhyupadēśa* being most thoughtfully and suggestively explained as *sarveṣām adhikātvena upadēśāt* - quoting this very text of the *Puruṣa Sūkta*.

With this shifting of emphasis from the outer to the inner world of man's states of existence, his struggles and his quest for rest-*vide*, *Sayathā śakunis sūtreṇa prabaddho diśam pativā any-atrāyatanam alabdhvā bandhanam eva upāśrayate* (*Chāṇ. Up.*) in the final source of all finite life arises the birth of true philosophy. Following the Āraṇyakas the Upanisads completed the extension of sway of this Supreme governing principle of the Universe as holding the key to the very existence, power of knowing and functioning of all finite reality (*aitadātmyam idam sarvam-Chāṇ. Up.*) meaning all this in the Universe has that unseen Power (*aṇimā*)



as its inner ruler (*ātmā*). This sums up neatly the quintessence of the Upaniṣadic teaching. As Rāmānuja points out in *Śrībhāṣya*, Uddālaka's statement *Tat tvam asi* in the concluding part of his *upadeśa* does not make any independent predication. It merely extends the application of the general principle that all this has the Supreme Being for its inner Ruler to the particular case of the person addressed viz. Śvetaketu, who represents the inquiring self, the Jīvāman, thereby pricking the bubble of his vanity and self conceit in supposing that he had mastered the secret of all Vedic lore (of. *Sarvān Vedān adhītya mahāmanā anucānamānī stabdha eyāya*) and making him realise that like everything else in the universe he too is dependent on the same Unseen Power of God. सामान्यतः (*Pratijñātārthasya viśeṣe upasamhārah*).

The laying down of universal propositions like *Īśāvāsyam idam sarvaṃ* (the whole universe is the abode of God) *Aitadātmīyam idam sarvaṃ* (All this has the Supreme Being as its ruler and indwelling Controller) as the corner-stone of Upaniṣadic philosophy in both the shortest and the longest of the Upaniṣads naturally led to an absorbing interest in the continued pursuit of philosophical reflections on the relationship between the human personality and its environment - the world of matter and their common governing principle. *Tam Ātmastham ye anupaśyanti dhīras teṣām śukham śāśvataṃ netareṣām* (there is eternal happiness for those who are able to perceive the great Being seated in one's self and not for others - *Śvet Up*) We see here that the Lord present in the individual needs must be different from it.

The Upaniṣads clothe their thoughts in Mystic language and idiom with colorful analogies and parables. For this reason the logical steps in their philosophical pronouncements and postulations often remain obscure in the background and have to be drawn out and developed systematically thro' discursive reasoning and given concrete form and shape. This was done in the Nirṇāyaka Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

The philosophical etymology of the term "Upaniṣad" given by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Kaṭha Up.* on the basis of the three inter-related meanings of the root 'sad' with 'upa' and 'ni' as prefixes, signifying the Vidya or lore which loosens the bonds of transmigration, destroys the seed of Avidyā and



leads one to Brahman is acceptable to Madhva. He therefore insists that being intended to give us the highest knowledge of Brahman (*auṇisadaḥ puruṣaḥ*) these Upaniṣads ought to be interpreted uniformly, consistently and exclusively so as to reveal the transcendental majesty of Brahman as the *Sattāpramī-pravṛtī-nimitta* of all finite reality, the universal Creator (*Viśvasya kartā*) the inner indwelling controller of the Universe (*Viśva-antaryāmi*) towering high above all (*Viśvataḥ paramam*) - see *Atyatiṣṭhad daśāṅgulam* - and that they (*the Upaniṣads*) should never be deflected from their highest purpose, aim and objective (*mahātātparya*) and made to stray into miscellaneous topics pertaining to Aparavidyā : *Upanisattvācca viśeṣato na yatkinsid ucyata iti vaktum yuktam, Abhagavadviśayasya ninditatvācca na upaniṣatsu anyad ucyate* (MBrh. Up. Com.).

In accordance with this basic approach, Madhva's commentary on the Upaniṣads rigorously and consistently bring out how the various Vidyās (meditations) taught in them such as the Gāyatri Vidyā, Pancāgni Vidyā, Udgītha Vidyā, Bhārgavi-Vārūṇi Vidyā, Saptāṇṇa Vidyā, etc. have for their subject matter *only* the Supreme Majesty of Brahman, possessed of infinite perfections as the immanent source of all cosmic life and its unfolding without being at the same time touched in the least by their changes of state and other shortcomings.

The whole fabric and pattern of Upaniṣadic thought as conceived above, leading to the realisation of Brahman thro' a rich variety of coordinated points of view conveying the central thesis of Brahman has been set forth by Jayatīrtha in his exposition of the *Satsiddhānta* of the Śrutis, as conceived by Madhva.

As the sustaining source of all, the Upaniṣadic Brahman must necessarily be in all forms of material evolution and in the psycho-physical states of all living beings such as the waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and their peregrinations in the other worlds after death here and be steering then all. This provides the key to Madhva's interpretation of the description of the Avasthātraya of the Jīvas in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and elsewhere in the Brh. Up. masterminded by the Antaryāmi-Brahman. It is not without significance that the Māṇḍūkya



itself refers to the "*Antaryāmi*" in this connection *Eṣa sarvajña Eṣo Antaryāmi Eṣa yonih sarvasya, prabhavāpya-yan hi bhūgtānām.* (6)

The following facts should make this clear.

(1) The etymology of "*Ātman*" as quoted by Śankara in his commentary on the *Kaṭha* has reference to an all-pervasive all-energising intelligent principle which sustains and regulates all cosmic life by its immanence and transcendence, as pointed out by the *Brh.Up* and differs from the transmigrating selves which are dubbed as *ārta* (subject to pain and suffering) (*ato anyad ārtam*). The *Jīvātman* who is subject to the vicissitudes of Karma and rebirth cannot at all be said to be *an-ārta* or to be of a constant nature (*santato bhāvah*) within the meaning of the term *Ātman* as accepted by Śankara, at least till he is released from bondage and agelong transmigration. Such subjection to bondage is not exactly a token of his maintaining a constant nature (*santato bhāvah*) at all times, - unless transmigration is itself dismissed as an imaginary state of self-delusion. That would involve more unproved assumption of the falsity of the experience of bondage. As what is false is a product of ignorance, the possibility of Ignorance screening the self-luminous *Ātman* (*Śvaprakāśa*) somehow, giving rise to the appearance of the world and the *Jīva*'s place in it will open the door to more difficult problems than could be solved.

(2) A verse from the *Tantra* quoted by Śīdhara Śāmin, the famous Advaita commentator on the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* derives "*Ātman*" (from *ā-tata mā+tr*) meaning the Lord who pervades all, inside and out (*Sarvāntaratarah* as the *Brh.Up.* also puts it) and who knows everything-*Ātatatvāe ca mātrtvad Ātmā hi paramo Hariḥ*. This is the most important Mystic etymology of the term.

(3) The opening sentence of the *Ait. Up.* speaking about the pre-creation stage of the world says "*Ātman* alone existed in the beginning. Nothing else winked then" (was active).

(4) The *Taitt. Up.* after stating that the knower of Brahman attains the supreme and defining the Supreme as *Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma*, says in the same breath, "From that aforesaid "*Atman*" *Ākāśa* was born, from *Ākāśa* *Vāyu*, from *Vāyu* fire "and



from food the Puruṣa". This should make it abundantly clear that the "Ātman" spoken of here cannot be the individual self who forms part of the created Universe in the evolution.

(5) A famous passage in the *Brh. Up.* (III 7.3-23) brings out the glaring difference between Jīva and the Ruler of the Cosmos who indwells in him as in everything else such as Pṛthvi, Āpaḥ, Vāyu, Agni, Manas, Prāṇa, the Sun and the Moon, the eyes and the ears and last but not the least in the "Self" and controls him from within whom the self does not know and at the end of this long recital the sage Yājñavalkya declares - He is *your* "Ātmā" - the "Antaryāmi" (*eṣa te ātmā antaryāmi*)

All else other than the Antaryāmi is subject to misery" (*ato anyad ārtam*). Writing about this very passage in his *Sūtrabhāṣya* Śaṅkara himself says:

"*Eṣa te Ātmā Antaryāmi amṛtaḥ*" *iti ca ātmatva - amṛtatve mukhye Paramātmāna eva upapadyete. Tasmāt śārirād anyañ Iśvaro Antaryāmi iti siddham*".

These are sufficient to establish that in the considered opinion of the Upaniṣads, the embodied self is *not* the one which has been referred to by the term *Ātmā* in any of these higher momentous contexts.

Once the true sense of the term *Ātman* is thus settled beyond reasonable doubt, there should be no further difficulty in understanding with Madhva how all the Vedantic texts speak primarily of the one Supreme Being as the object of our spiritual quest and realisation. Hence it is the Supreme Brahman that is entitled to be designated as the *Aupanishadaḥ - Puruṣaḥ* - the Being who controls all *Cetana* and *Acetana prapañca*, embedded in the heart of the Upaniṣads as its secret. This will enthrone Theism as the ultimate truth of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, for which thinking men all over the world will have to be grateful to Madhva for enabling them to see it.

#### THE STATE OF MOKṢA IN MADHVA'S PHILOSOPHY.

Madhva believes in the survival of every individual personality as such in Mokṣa. This is the corollary of his acceptance



of the distinctiveness of Svarupa of each Jīva. As release consists, in his view in the realisation of the intrinsic bliss of selfhood by each one and as this bliss is at the same time incommunicable to others, it is a positive experience to be felt and realised by each one of them. We cannot, therefore, ask how the blissful experience of one self differs from that of another. It is purely a matter of intuitive experience of each individual and we have to leave it at that. As Rāmānuja says- *Jīvasvarūpam jñānānandalakṣaṇam. Tasyaitasya Svarūpabhedo vācām agocarāḥ svasamvedyo jñānasvarūpam ityetāvad eva nirdeśyam.* Hence it will be presumptuous on our part to attempt to define in clear and precise terms what the released state would be like, *from this side* of release. Nevertheless, man is irrepressibly curious and inquisitive about what lies in store for him in the great beyond. People expect the philosopher to throw some light on these questions. As an interpreter and expositor of the traditions of the Vedaśāstra on this point, Madhva bases his account on the scriptural facts and evidences. He also adduces reasons in support of these interpretations. He gives a consistent picture of the released state harmonising the realistic and idealistic accounts found in the Vedas and the Upaniṣads and Post Upaniṣadic sources. It must be said that his is a distinctive view, differing from other Realistic conceptions of it of the Nyāya school and also of Rāmānuja's in important respects. It is uncompromising in principles, trenchant in its logic and discloses a measure of Mystic inwardness in some respects.

The first and foremost feat about Mokṣa emphasised by him is its positive aspect. He is opposed to the purely negative view of it held by the Sāṅkhyas and the Naiyāyikas, Mokṣa to be a *Puruṣārtha* and the highest one at that must be fully manifested-i.e. capable of being actually felt and enjoyed with a full consciousness that it is being enjoyed. This would naturally presuppose the survival of the one who is to enjoy the experience of the blissed state. In this connection Madhva discusses the famous text *Na pretya samjñā asti* in the Maitreya Brāhmaṇa of the *Brh. Up.* in his *VTN* and shows that Maitreya's difficulty in accepting the loss of personal consciousness in Mokṣa was based on its incompatibility with being a *Puruṣārtha* and *not* on account of the alleged self-contradiction between the earlier and later statements of Yājñavalkya in first describing the self as



Vijnānaghana (mass of consciousness) and later denying the survival of consciousness as such. This is a very crucial point *not noticed* or brought to light by any other commentator on the *Brh. Up* before viz., that if the difficulty felt by Maitreyi was on account of the self contradiction created by Yājñavalkya's earlier and later descriptions we should expect such a self contradiction to be pinpointed by Maitreyi by quoting both the statements giving rise to such a contradiction. As she has not done any such thing, and has quoted instead *only* the later statement of Yājñavalkya "*Na pretya samjna asti iti*" it follows that her objection was based on the extinction of personal consciousness in Mokṣa depriving the goal of its *Puruṣārthato* or a worthwhile object of human pursuit. Accordingly, Madhva finds it only reasonable to construe the three posers of Yājñavalkya in his explanation - beginning with *Yatra hi Dvaitam iva bhavati....* *Yenedam sarvam vijānati tam kena vijānīyāt* and *Vijnatāram are kena vijānīyāt* as three parts of a *reductio ad absurdum* intended to establish the survival of duality in Mokṣa, the presence of knowledge of the Supreme and of his own self by the released Jīva. The Muktas express their joy thro' various acts of spontaneous worship, singing *sāmans* in sheer joy (*etat sāma gāyan āste hā u hā u*). There is no prescribed round of activities or code of conduct as they have risen above the sphere of mandates. The gradations among the released souls (*Tāratāmya*) being intrinsic to them does not lead to any jealousy or discord among the released souls, whose quantum of *svarūpānanda* manifested in release is not uniform. For hatred, jealousy and discord are the outcome of *doṣas* (flaws) and bad passions. Since Mokṣa is a state which is free from all such defects, the presence of gradation (*tāratāmya*) does not lead to any heartburning among them. There is complete harmony and fellowship among them. Madhva has given a highly suggestive analogy of how this could be, by comparing the released souls and their relationship to those superior to them in their natural gradation, as the relationship of an ideal *śishya* to his Guru (whose knowledge and attainments are greater than his disciple's (*Aupasadavat*)). This is based on a very thoughtful and thought-provoking interpretation of the words of the Brahmasūtras-*Akṣaradhiyām tu avirohaḥ aupasadavat*- there is no discord among the God-intoxicated".



## LECTURE III

## MADHVA'S CONTRIBUTION

1. GUIDE-LINES FOR SOLUTION OF THE  
CONFLICT OF ADVAITA-SRUTIS WITH PERCEPTUAL  
EVIDENCE AND EXPERIENCE

Among the well-known *Pramāṇas* of Perception, Inference and Śabda (Śruti or Āgama) the last enjoys the place of honor according to all schools of Vedānta. Madhva himself has quoted a verse from *Brahma Tarka* to this effect :

*Prābalyam āgamasyaivā jātya teṣu triṣu Smṛtam*

This seems to give a privileged position of vantage to the Advaitavāda based on Monistic-looking texts like *Tattvam asi*, *Neha nāsti kiñcana*, etc., over the Realistic position about the uncontradicted reality of the external world and the experience of the joys and sorrows of life and the difference between the individual Selves and Brahman, for ever and their survival in the released state also. As Madhva himself is committed to the superior status of the Śruti among the *Pramāṇas* one would naturally expect him to have given serious thought how to maintain his rigid Realism without coming into conflict with the "Advaita Śrutis". Some Nyāya philosophers have tried to explain that the Monistic texts are intended only for meditation (*Upāsana*) and so there is no conflict. This does not satisfy Madhva according to whom *Upāsana* must be true to fact and admits of no superimposition. He, therefore, approaches the problem from a different standpoint.

First of all, he confronts the Advaitavādin with the admittedly greater percentage of Śrutis in the Upaniṣads themselves in support of the reality of the world and the differences between Jiva and Brahman, which continue to exist in the released state



also — as compared with a handful of Monistic - looking texts cited by the other school - such as the “Mahāvākyas”.

This puts the Advaita in a more difficult position than the Realist in having to disarm not only the evidence of consolidated human experience about the plurality of selves and the reality of the external world and its vivid experiences but the backing given to them by the numerous *Bheda Śrutis* themselves in these Upaniṣads to the Realistic view, not to speak of the large measure of attention given in them to the details of the creation, sustenance, dissolution and control of the universe by the Supreme Being and the peregrination of the Souls in other worlds before taking rebirth here again and the efforts they have to put forth to attain final release.

It will be seen that from this point of view Madhva philosophy enjoys the double advantage of (1) the support of the *Bheda Śrutis* and of Universal human experience of the reality of the external world and God's interest in its creation, sustenance and control from within. We read in these texts “knowing the Superior Brahman as distinct from one's self and its indwelling inspirer and being accepted by Him one attains immortality” (*Munḍ. Up.*) “He is your inner indwelling Ruler (*Antaryāmi Ātmā*) who is present in your own self but whom the self knows not” (*Bṛh. Up.*). “After leaving this world once and for all, the Jīva approaches the Blissful Ruler” (*Taitt. Up.*). What remains for Madhva is to find a reasonable and satisfactory way reconciling the Monistic-looking texts with the basic requirements of his realistic philosophy.

Before going to that point, it is necessary to examine how far the Monist has been successful in disarming the opposition of the *Bheda Śrutis* and clear the ground for himself. He jumps over the first hurdle by calling to aid the doctrine of *Mithyātvā* or falsity of all experience here and now. Falsity is so defined as to accommodate within it two levels of lower truth the Vyāvahārika (practical or conventional) and the illusory real — both open to liquidation, the former by Brahmic knowledge representing the Pāramārthika truth and the latter by correct knowledge soon after the illusion.



In this way both the *Bheda Śrutis* and the consolidated testimony of human experience of the reality of the external world and of beings therein are brought within the grip of falsity, under the name of *Vyāvahārika satya* while Advaitic realisation of oneness of all remains the sole real truth *par excellence*.

The subject of *Mithyātva* of universal human experience of differences and the joys and sorrows of life has been discussed and refuted by Madhva and his commentators at great length and depth in their writings. There is no need to go into them here.

As for the *Bheda Śrutis*, it seems to be anomalous that the *Upaniṣads* which are *Brahmavidyā* and *Paravidyā* should harbour so many thorns of *Bheda Śrutis* in their sides. Why should they allow the intrusion of the hostile forces within their territory and then take the trouble to dislodge them by hook or crook?

The same question cannot be put to the Realist. For in his opinion there really are no Advaita Śrutis. What pass for such admit of cogent interpretation in full conformity with the requirements of Realism. Take the *Neha nānāsti* text for instance, which the Advaita has construed to mean that there is no world of duality whatsoever meaning that our experience of it is false and superimposed on Brahman. But a strict adherence to the wording here and syntax would make it clear that *iha* signifies Brahman. The negation of duality contemplated in Brahman must relate to something pertaining to Brahman – such as its attributes of *Jñāna*, *ānanda* and not of the world which does *not* *inhere* in Brahman but in its material causal stuff of Matter. The denial of such attributes as existing apart (*nānā*) from Brahman leads to the logical conclusion that they are not different from the essence of Brahman but are part and parcel of its essence of being. This is a case of *significant negation* of separate existence of Brahman's attributes. The numerous attributes of Brahman are natural to its being and non-different from its "*Spāḥbhāviki*" as another Upaniṣadic text tells us – censuring the view that Brahman and its attributes are different – as the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and some other schools hold.



*Evam dharmān prthak paśyan  
Tāmeva anuvīdhāvati (Kāṭha Up.)*

The *Tat tvam asi* text also has been explained as emphasising that like everything else in the entire universe the Jīvātman too has the One Supreme Being for his inner Ruler and indwelling principle - (*aitadātmyan*). It is to be noted here that the neuter pronoun *Tat* here has for its antecedent the compound *aitadātmyam* (which is also a neuter form) which provides a smooth *anvaya* (syntactical connection) for it. We have already seen how the overall *Samanvaya* of the whole gamut of currents of thought in the *Upaniṣads*, including the Monistic-looking texts have been shown to converge on the central thesis of the *Upaniṣads* — the Majesty of Brahman. So far then as the Monistic - looking texts are concerned, there is no problem for Madhva.

On the other hand, the Dualistic texts retain their dualistic connotation. They stick to their actual meaning. But in order to get over the difficulty they create for the Monist, they have been labelled as *anuvāduka* i.e. intended merely to recapitulate and repeat the complexities of the world of matter and souls, for purposes of final dismissal and negation by the Monistic texts such as *Neha nānāsti*. This theory consigns more than three fourth of the contents of the *Upaniṣads* to the limbo of the negatable. The reason for their negation is that they deal with Vyāvahārikabheda, while the Advaita Śrutis speak the language of Pāramārthika-abheda. The question why they should be limited to Vyāvahārikabheda has to be answered by saying - because they are negated. The question why they should at all be negated is answered by saying because they speak of Vyāvahārikabheda. This involves an interdependence in argument.

Madhva has himself renewed the Advaita explanation that the *Bheda-Śrutis* are merely recapitulatory in their character and are not predicative or prescriptive in any sense.

When the *Bheda Śrutis* are reduced to the level of Vyāvahārikabheda their validity as Śrutis is also automatically reduced to Vyāvahārika prāmānya instead of Pāramārthika prāmānya. What is Vyāvahārika is necessarily sublated - no



matter when. The longer the delay in its sublation the greater will be the intensity of the illusion it perpetuates - and that is no compliment to be paid to the Śrutis which are voted to the highest place of honour among Pramāṇas. Madhva points out that Vyavahārika prāmāṇya is a misnomer. Prāmāṇya or validity of knowledge according to all schools of Vedānta is considered to be intrinsic to knowledge (*svataḥ prāmāṇya*) as against the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view that validity is extrinsic to knowledge (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*). Since Advaita philosophy also subscribes to Svataḥ-prāmāṇyavāda, it would be inconsistent for it to talk of *svataḥ prāmāṇya* and its sublation in the same voice.

*Prāmāṇyasya ca maryādā kālato vyāhatā bhavet  
Kālāntare pramāṇam ced idānīm mānatā kutah?*

Validity is inconceivable without involving the uncontradictedness of the content of knowledge. It is a question of fact and not of the duration of the content. If this factual veracity is to desert knowledge and its experience it would be a misuse of language to call it validity.

Regarding the alleged Anuvādakatva or recapitulatory role of the *Bheda Śrutis*, Madhva says that when the Apauruṣeya Śruti takes the responsibility of resorting to an Anuvāda, it must naturally be presumed that what it repeats by way of Anuvāda is a well-established fact, reiterated for authoritative affirmation or edification of seekers of truth. The Śruti cannot be concerned with idle gossip or bother itself about its negation. It stands to reason, therefore, that the differences and dualities recapitulated by the *Bheda Śrutis* must be borne out by Pramāṇas. If so, they cannot be negated by the *Nehanānāsti* Śruti. If not established by Pramāṇas those differences pertaining to the world of matter and souls cannot be made the subject of an Anuvāda.

That apart, a recapitulation and its negation must be in the same context and the negation must be clearly indicated by some suitable words such as - "*that is not so*". Statements made in one *Upaniṣad* about the creation of the world cannot be negated by another *Upaniṣad* - unless what is to be negated is also cited *verbatim* and negated. Besides, an *anuvāda* can also be



made for purposes of reinforcement to dispose of dis-agreement expressed by other thinkers (*Vādivipratipatti*) – as Śāṅkara himself states in regard to the Śruti *Asti ityevopalabdavyaḥ* in his commentary on the *Bṛh.up.* Thus in keeping with the dignity of status of the *Upaniṣads*, it would be taking too much of a liberty with them to dismiss the *Bheda Śrutis* which are unpalatable to the Monist as not-truth-declaring and as intended only for purposes of negation by *Neha nānāsti*.

### THE CRITERION OF UPAJĪVYA PRAMĀNA PRĀBALYA

When any two Pramāṇas are in conflict, the conflict is to be resolved on the basis of, which of them is the *Upajīvyā* in regard to the other. *Upajīvyā* is the foundational datum. *Upajīvaka* is the superstructure on it. The superstructure must be in keeping with the foundation to pass muster. Mere temporal precedence or priority is *not* the proof of *upajīvyatva*. Duly verified *upajīvyatva* (*parīkṣitatva viśiṣṭam*) is however irrefragable and is entitled to set aside or modify the *upajīvaka* depending on the nature of the case. Notwithstanding their high status as Śruti, the Monistic-looking texts are open to conflict with the *Bheda Śrutis* which are *upajīvyā* in respect of the *Abheda Śrutis*. We have already seen that Madhva establishes the validity of consolidated human experiences of the joys and sorrows of life, and related facts established by perceptual evidence on the final basis of *Sākṣipratyakṣa*, which is the acid test of all truth. He is aware that some perceptions may err sometimes. But not so duly tested *Pratyakṣa* or what he calls *Parīkṣitapratyakṣa*. The *parīkṣā* ends when the *Sākṣi* sets its seal of satisfaction and approval on the result of the tests. Intuitive experiences of *Sukha* and *duḥkha* have never been known to be open to doubt or contradiction. We may recall the words of Jayatīrtha here –

*Asmābhir api duḥkhādibandhasya satyatāyām sākṣipratyakṣam eva upanyastam iti hṛdayam*

that the Dvaita philosophers take their stand on the evidence of *Sākṣi* in the last analysis, in respect of the vivid experiences of embodied life.

From this vantage then, Madhva holds that the *Bheda Śrutis* backed by our *Sākṣipratyakṣa* are the *Upajīvyā Pramāṇa*



in respect of the Monistic-looking Texts. Hence the latter must defer to their finding, by allowing themselves to be construed in other suitable ways avoiding a head-on collision. Madhva has himself suggested many suitable ways in which the Abheda Śrutis can be explained and accommodated without infringing on the basic truth of the *Bheda Śrutis*, which are their Upajīvyā, such as from the point of view of the independence of Brahman as in *rājā rāṣṭram*, its being the highest reality that exists (as "by knowing Somaśarmā all Kathas are known" and from the point of view of identity of place, harmony in thought, similarity of certain attributes and so on — short of *Svarūpaikyā*

*Svātantrye ca viśiṣṭatva sthānamatyaikeyayor api  
Sādṛśye caikyavāk samyak sāvakāśa yatheṣṭatah.*

The difficulty in pressing for the identity of essence between Jīva and Brahman which is supposed to be the purport of the Monistic texts is that such *Svarūpaikyā* as between the two is opposed to Upajīvyā-Pramāṇa. To explain — the Jīva as given by Sākṣipratyakṣa is a finite being of limited intelligence, bliss, power and other attributes, while the Supreme Brahman as understood from the Śrutis is infinite in all respects. A *viśiṣṭaikyā* between two such beings would be unthinkable — as between a well and the ocean or the atom and the Meru mountain. This contradiction will persist irrespective of whether the identity proposition is moved making either the Jīva or Brahman the subject and the other the predicate of identity. The difficulty cannot be overcome by dropping all the determinants of both of them and pressing for an identity. These attributes of Jīva and Brahman cannot be dropped as they are the essence of them as the Śruti says in respect of Brahman —

*Parāśya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate  
Svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca*

In any case, a bare identity of both as pure consciousness (*Cit*) would be tautologous as *Cit is cit*. To speak of *this cit* being identical with *that Cit* would be impossible as there is only one *Cit* in Advaita thought. That the thesis of identity between



Jīva and Brahman cannot escape *Upajīvyā Pramāṇa virodha*, and has, therefore to be abandoned.

It may be asked – What is there to choose between the two approaches of the Monist and the Realist – in dismissing the *Bheda Śrutis* as *Anuvādaka* or in calling for a modification of the meaning of the *Abheda Śrutis* on grounds of *upajīvyaprābalya*?

Madhva would say there is much to choose. The principle of *Upajīvyā-Pṛābalya* is a sound and accepted principle of epistemology. Its influence can be seen even in the Monist's opting for *Bhāgatyāgalakṣaṇā* to avoid head on collision between the *Bheda* and *Abheda Śrutis* for fear of *Pratyakṣavirodha*. The modification of the literal sense to some extent out of regard for the status of the *Śruti* has the sanction of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Śāstra* also as can be seen from various instances under the *Sūtra Tatsiddhi-jātisārūpya-prāśamsā bhūmalīṅga samavāyāt* in such examples of Vedic texts like *Ādityo yūpaḥ*—the sacrificial post is the Sun, *Yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ* — the handful of *darbha* grass is the sacrificer" and so on. The reduction of the status of the *Bheda Śrutis* and the consolidated experience of humanity to the lower level of *Vyāvahārika prāmāṇya* not opposed to the *Pāramārthika prāmāṇya* of identity is not known in any *Vaidika darśana* outside the *Advaita* school. It can only be found in the *Mādhyamaka* school of Buddhism of *Nāgārjuna* —

*Doe satye samupāśritya Buddhānām dharmadeśanā  
Loke samvrttisayam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ*

It is only a corollary of the *Brahmājñānavāda* which itself rests on so many other assumptions.

So, it is after weighing the pros and cons, Madhva propounds a viable solution on the conflict of *Bheda* and *Abheda Śrutis* on the one hand and of the consolidated experiences of human life with the acosmic texts, on the basis of the very second half of the verse from the *Brahmatarka* itself उपजीव्यविशेषे तु नास्याः तन्मानता भवेत् and on other grounds; that the *Śruti* is absolute authority in matters which fall directly and exclusively under its jurisdiction such as determination of the existence and the



nature and attributes of God, His personality, manifestations, as Avatāras, etc.

*Āgamaika prāmaṇeṣu tasyaiva hyupajīvyatā*

This includes the existence and nature of supersensuous reals and values of Dharma, adharma, etc. But when the Śruti appears to be in conflict with its upajīvyaprāmaṇa in matters falling within the legitimate sphere of the Sākṣi, it is the Sākṣipratyakṣa and *anubhava* based on it that is the *upajīvyā* of such Śrutis. This marks off the spheres and boundaries of Śruti and Pratyakṣa (Sākṣi) in a very thoughtful way. Neither Pratyakṣa nor Śruti is allowed to invade or intrude into each other's jurisdiction.

Thus Madhva's approach shows a balanced outlook of a genuine philosopher, even in the modern sense of that term. There are uncommitted Vedantins to-day, in our own country and elsewhere, who are silently nursing a complaint, unable to voice it openly—that Indian philosophy is under the thralldom of textual authority. Whether one agrees with Madhva or not, it must be admitted that he has opened a new approach to the understanding of Vedānta philosophy and given a new lead to thought which must give some satisfaction to writers like Dr. Jvala Prasad (*History of Indian Philosophy*) who has bemoaned that

*"There has been no original contribution  
to Indian Philosophy for centuries."*



## 2. OTHER IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO INDIAN THOUGHT

Madhva's philosophical concepts and categories differ much in their scope and purpose from those of its contemporary systems and earlier ones. In some cases the nomenclature is retained and the conceptions are different. He is generally allergic to over-elaboration of details and picturesque Prakriyās. A robust philosophical commonsense and a rigid legend for the tests of truth characterise his logic, epistemology and ontology. He does with the barest minimum of presuppositions. His theories disclose both idealistic and realistic leanings in important respects. He does not shrink or shy away from them because of their scholastic affiliations with this or that system. His acceptance of Svarūpabheda among distincts shows a realistic bent and identity in difference (Saviśeṣa abheda) between substance and its permanent attributes a strong idealistic bent. On the other hand, his rejection of the Universal *sāmānya* shows an extreme realistic attitude undreamt of in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other realisms. His realism is wide enough to admit of the possibility of erroneous knowledge in life and he does not feel called upon to agree with Rāmānuja that all knowledge including that of "*śuktirajata*" (silver in shell) is *Yathārtha* and that the so-called erroneous knowledge (*bhrama*) is a blundering into the truth. There is thus no truth in the assumption of some scholars that "Madhva's philosophical teaching was mainly based on Pre-Madhva realisms of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā" or that he makes a clever use of Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, in the development of his views.

Madhva is most original in his ontological classification of Tattva as Svatantra and Paratantra. This is the keynote of his Siddhānta which derives its name of "Dvaita" from it. As a philosopher, Madhva yields to none in maintaining that the Svatantra Tattva or the Independent Real can only be ONE while the Paratantras can be many in number and dependent all of them on the ONE Independent. It is the Svatantra Tattva which holds the entire finite reality in position and balance like the pearls in a garland by the thread.

*Mayi sarvam idam protam sūtre maṇigaṇā iva (Gītā)*



The Svatantra sustains the promise and potency of all that is Paratantra. The definitions of the Svatantra based on his explanations in his *AV* has been elucidated by Jayatīrtha in his commentary as *Svarūpaprāmītipravṛttirūpasattātraividhye Parānapēkṣam Svatantram, tadapekṣam asvatantram*). The Independent Principle is that which does *not* depend on any other for its own nature and existence, its self-awareness and/or knowability and for its functioning, in which it expresses and manifests itself. Commenting on the statement *Dvividham tattvam iṣyate* he says it signifies that it is the only philosophically viable proposition. The existence of two equally independent principles is logically and metaphysically inconceivable. Hence there can be only one Svatantra in existence. All the rest, comprising finite reality, whether sentient or insentient must be dependent on the Svatantra. The dependents cannot obviously control one another without a higher principle to connect them. Otherwise, there will be a regression of strike and opposition through which they would all destroy one another and there will be no reality left behind. The dependents cannot also come together for interaction of their own accord without some other power enabling them to do so.

Jayatīrtha makes it clear that the classification of Tattva into the dependent and the independent (one) is the only philosophically sound, meaningful and purposeful one. The other classifications into positive and negative, Cetana and Acetana, are irrelevant to the purpose of Vedānta as a Mokṣasāstra.

Madhva calls this classification the 'Satsiddhānta' the right philosophical perspective in which the Supreme Being called by whatever name, as Brahman, Paramātmān, God or Puruṣottama, occupies the highest status. The various currents of thought in the Upaniṣads converge smoothly and beautifully on this central point as elucidated by Jayatīrtha with his usual persuasive eloquence: All Upaniṣadic texts without exception speak of the Majesty of Brahman as the abode of infinite perfections and free from all metaphysical imperfections. Of these, (1) some represent it as endowed with attributes like omniscience, lordship, inner rulership of matter and souls, beauty, goodness, etc. (2) others represent it as free from all limitations of sin, suffering, liability to physical embodiment, decay and death, (3) yet others describe



it as lying beyond the reach of human thought and speech in order to bring home to us its comparative inaccessibility (*atigahanatājñāpanāya*)-as in *Yato vāco nivartante; āśnādam aspṛśam* (4) some others depict it as the only ONE that exists (*Ekam eva advītiyam*) in order that it may be understood and realised as the source of all existence, knowledge and functioning in finite reality (*Sarvasattāpramitiṣṭi-avṛttinimitatāprati-patyartham*) as the "Self" (*ātmā*) of all from a variety of interconnected standpoints converging on the majesty of the ONE. But confused heads missing this central unity of the Vedic teaching mar this unity by introducing artificial distinctions of *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* *Vidyā*s and *Vyavahāra* and *Paramārtha* levels of truth, in interpreting the *Upaniṣads*.

Madhva's contributions to Indian Epistemology have been equally seminal. We have already seen how his doctrine of the *Sākṣi* as the appraiser of all knowledge and its validity gives meaning to the Vedāntic belief in the self-validity of knowledge (*svataḥprāmāṇya*). His doctrine of "*Svarūpaviśeṣas*" bridges the gulf between substance and its permanent attributes. As applied to the essential attributes of Brahman, such as its reality, omniscience and blissfulness it keeps intact the oneness of its essence (*aikarāsyam*) by making it possible to make a distinction of reference among them without involving a distinct of essence among themselves or the Being of Brahman.

*Bhedahīnetyaḥparyāyīśabdāntarānīyāmakaḥ*  
*Viśeṣo nāma māthitas so asti vastuṣpāṣeṣataḥ.*

His conception of creation of eternal substances also in a Pickwickian sense of *Paradhīna* *Viśeṣāpti* avoids the difficulties of creation in time accepted by some other Theistic Systems. The cosmic dispensations of Brahman include besides creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world of matter and souls, other equally important ones of universal control, bringing about the temporary obscuration of part of the *Svarūpa* of *Jīvas* in bondage and bestowing enlightenment, bondage and release. *Vyāsātirtha* in his *Candrikā* has made it clear how the eightfold dispensation of the world of matter and souls is the more complete conception of Brahman's *Jagatkāraṇatva* and has the full support of *Śruti*s and the internal evidence of the *Brahma-Sūtras*.



The concept of Saviśeṣābheda between substance and its intrinsic attributes avoids the pitfalls of other suggested relations of absolute difference, Nirviśeṣa-abheda, Bhedābheda and Samavāya. Madhva regards it as a Sarvatantrasiddhānta. It is a concept which could be used in many other spheres of thought.

Madhva's doctrine of Bimbapratibimbabhāva (original and reflected image) avoids the contingency of the impermanence of the image (Jīva) by dispensing with external upādhis in explaining this symbolic relation. Jīvasvarūpa in its pristine purity has the inbuilt capacity to reveal to the Jīva in the released state, his true relation of resemblance in respect of his attributes of jñāna, ānanda, etc. and his ontological dependence on Brahman for his own being, becoming and functioning.

His views on Svarūpabheda and Tāratamya among souls have important contributions to make to the discussion of the problem of Evil, Freedom and Freewill and takes the Hindu theory of Anādi Karma at least one decisive step further in explaining the how and why of basic inequalities in equipment, endowment and opportunities of souls in the cycle of births.

Though the *Vedas* have been recognised as the fountain-head of Indian thought, it was left to Madhva to make meaningful the supreme position given to them as Apauruṣeya Pramāṇa in regard to transcendental truths. The ancient Ārṣa tradition of Vedic interpretation held that the chief subject matter of the Vedic hymns lauded in and through the names of several deities such as Indra, Mitra, Varuṇa, Yama and Agni, in the fullest primary sense of their connotations, one supreme Creator and Ruler of the Cosmos — without prejudice to limited jurisdiction of these several deities referred to in the accepted conventional meanings of their names and their limited spheres of jurisdiction in the government of Cosmos under the aegis of the One.

This higher interpretation of the hymns is proclaimed in such passages as the following:

yo devānām nāmadbā eka eva  
indram mitram varuṇam agnim āhuḥ



ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti  
 agniṁ yamaṁ mātariśvānam āhuḥ  
 kaś chandasām yogam aveda dhīraḥ?

The very manner of predication here -*devānām nāmadhā*- presupposes the existence of the Devas. The same Ārṣa tradition is reflected in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka also —

sarve vedāḥ sarve ghoṣaḥ prāṇasca ityeva vidyāt  
 etam hyeva bahvṛca mahatyukte mīmāṃsante, etam agnau  
 mahāvrate chandogāḥ, etam āditye, sarveṣu bhūteṣu  
 etam eva brahma ityācakṣate

All these Vedic texts have been quoted by Madhva in his exposition of the esoteric interpretation of the hymns as referring to One Supreme Being in and through the names of the different deities.

The key to the systematic working out of the details of this esoteric doctrine of Vedic interpretation seems to have been lost already by the time of Yāska and the schools of the Niruktaś and Aitihāśikas mentioned by him. Only a few sporadic and scattered instances of such early approaches occur in some writings. But no regular work dealing with the methodology of such an esoteric interpretation are extant. So far as we know Madhva is the earliest to take up the matter seriously and give us an illustrative Commentary on the first 40 Sūktas of the Rg Veda, embodying the esoteric interpretations of the Sūktas, along with the other received interpretations of the historical or descriptive Adhidaiva and the Adhiyajña ways of interpretation.

Centuries after Madhva, Aurobindo has reopened the issue with his own code of word-imagery and symbolism underlying the words of the Seers. The founder of the Arya Samaj has given a strictly Monotheistic interpretation of the hymns, giving no place to the Devas, as he does not believe in their existence ...and does not recognise the authority of the Epics and Purāṇas. Western Vedic scholars like Geldner, Macdonell and Keith and modern Indian scholars following their track do not attach any importance to the possibility of giving a higher esoteric interpretation to the Vedic hymns. Referring to the



attempts of Aurobindo in that direction one of our eminent scholars has argued that the acceptance of any such possibility in the hymns would be tantamount to the reversal of the very process of the historical evolution of human thought and civilisation from the crudest beginnings to remarkable heights through millenniums of effort and progress. If this criterion is to be applied to the spiritual realm it would be difficult to explain how acknowledgedly great thinkers of the Vedic age like Vāmadeva and Yājñavalkya had reached the highest truths of philosophy in so remote an age. Or are we to deny that they had done anything of that kind?

Traditional schools of Indian Philosophy have always been exposed to one another's impact and influence through dialogic dialectics in their development. It is not as if this process came to a stop with the establishment of the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara and his followers.

Śaṅkara's abstract and unitary conception of Brahman as a static reality without any definite characteristics save negative ones was modified by Rāmānuja into an intra organic whole - a "Viśiṣṭādvaita" in which the *cit* and the *acit* are externally related to Brahman as its inseparable modes and the totality is conceived as a tri-unity. This came to be further modified by Madhva by bringing the *cit* and the *acit* under a single category of finite reality (*paratantra prameyam*) which is *ex hypothesi* ontologically dependent on the One Independent Reality for its being, becoming, knowledge and powers of functioning (*sattāpratīti-pravṛttiṣu parāpekṣam*). The Supreme Brahman which transcends finite reality is also immanent in it as the source of its *sattāpramiti-pravṛtti*. This conclusion is based on logical grounds as well as on scriptural authority such as *Satyasya satyam* (*Bṛh. Up.*), *Ya Ātmani tiṣṭhan ātmānam-antaro yamayati* (*Bṛh Up.*) as already made clear.

From this point of view, Madhva's philosophical ideology may be said to mark a further advance in metaphysical thinking. His classification of Prameya in Svatantra and Paratantra as above is the limit of subsumption of reals, beyond which it cannot be pushed, for the simple reason that what is Svatantra cannot be subsumed under what is Asvatantra and *vice versa*.



The impact of study of modern idealistic systems of the West by Indian philosophers from the early decades of the present century seems in course of time to have raised a question in their minds whether Indian philosophy in general and the Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara in particular needs any improvement or reorientation in the light of the latest developments in Western idealistic thought. It would appear that some radical modifications have actually been attempted in this direction.

However, in this context, it seems necessary to sound a note of caution that any such reorientation sought to be administered to the Advaita conception of the Absolute as a static, abstract and unitary real (*Nityasuddhabuddhamuktastabhāvam*) with no positive characteristics whatever (*Neha nānāsti, Neti neti*), in order to change its character into an Absolute of the concrete variety, "as a dynamic whole capable of accounting for the growing universe with its time and change, and which is so rich that its wealth of content cannot be exhausted by the intellect" would at once destroy its original character as conceived by Śaṅkara as *Nirviśeṣa*, *Nirguṇa*, *Nirdharmaka* and *Ekarasa* in his accredited works like the *Sūtrabhāṣya* and *Bhāṣyas* on the Upaniṣads. Moreover, Śaṅkara himself frowns upon *Anekāntavāda Anekātmakatva* of Brahman in his commentary on B.S. 1, 2, 14, while discarding the Vṛttikāra's view

However that may be, there can be no doubt that as the East and the West have come much closer to each other than ever before, in history and as frontiers of knowledge have been extended, a comparative study of each other's thought by the philosophers of the East and the West - both in respect of Realism and Idealism would contribute much to a better understanding and appreciation of each to the sum total of human thought, in areas of mutual and common interest and methodology.

Such a study has not so far been carried out in respect of the Realistic systems of Indian philosophy and in Vedānta in general and particularly with reference to the Dvaita system of Madhva, which stands in a class by itself. In my writings on the subject, I have been persistently drawing attention to the many interesting parallelisms and affinities, in thought and solution



to problems of philosophy between the findings of some of the wellknown exponents of medieval and modern Western Realisms. Some pioneering work has been done in this direction by Ignatius Puthiadam S. J. in his Svamikannu Pillai Endowment Lectures, ten years back on "*God in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and Śrī Madhvācārya*". Much more still remains to be done and I look forward to more substantial and comprehensive work to be done in the years to come under the auspices of this very Endowment and independently too.

If originality lies in the discovery of new methods of approach to solutions of existing problems, Madhva's philosophy provides many striking examples of it.

Let us take Logic itself, which is at least according to Western thought, is one of the basic foundations of metaphysics. But wherefrom does Logic itself get its validation? Surely, it is not from mere observation of more and more particulars alone — which can never be exhausted in one's lifetime. The justification of Logic cannot, therefore, be founded on the authority of Induction alone for the simple reason that one can still raise the question as to what is it that certifies the steps in the Inductive operation? Can Induction certify itself? If the answer is *No*, Logic becomes a broken reed. If the answer is *Yes*, we are driven to agree that somewhere at some stage of thought and ratiocination, *there is a self-certification of it without further logical probing* — i.e. there is an immediate self-validating judgement or intuition. It is the immediate perception of the truth by the perceiving or experiencing self by means of its intuitive perception which has been designated by the expressive term of *Sākṣi* or *Sākṣipratyakṣa* by Madhva, which is always veridical and self-certifying — as we have already seen:

*Na parīkṣānavasthā syāt sākṣisiddhatvasaṁśayāt  
Suddhas-sākṣi yadā siddhaḥ duḥkhitvaṁ vāryate katham.*

This is one of the most original outstanding and far-reaching contributions of Madhva to Indian Epistemology — nay to epistemology as such — as early as the 13th century, when, by and large, Western philosophy was still groping for it. In the same way, Madhva has pushed forward the traditional theory of the Law of



Karma as an explanation of the intriguing inequalities in equipment, endowment and opportunities of souls in creation, one more step forward to find a strictly logical and objective solution going beyond the familiar explanation of the Anāditva of individual Karma and situating the final explanation of the problem in the diversity of the intrinsic Svabhāva or core of being *Sattva* as individuals. There are not wanting many thinkers who feel in their heart of hearts that the theory of Anādi Karma does not provide a final explanation while seeming to do so — as the late Sir P.S. Sivasvami Ayyar has been frank enough to admit in his *Kamala Lectures*. Another example of Madhva's originality can be found in his rejection of the theory of creation of the world in time and the creation of Souls *ab initio* in some Theisms of the West and replacing them with Creation in the sense of Parādhīna-Viś śāpti which can be applied to all eternal verities, substances and principles — accepted in Indian thought — such as Space and Time, and Souls.

If originality consists in the application of some old methods or principles to some knotty problems, we have a striking example of it in Madhva's applications of the principle of Upajīvyapramāṇa-prābalya to the solution of the conflict between the Monistic texts of the Śruti and the evidence of Bheda Śrutis and universal human experience of the reality of the world.

### CONCLUSION

So long as the Sanskrit language was the *lingua franca* of the development and exchange of thought among scholars and students of philosophy belonging to different linguistic areas of ancient and medieval India, Dvaita philosophy held its place of honor among its compeers.

The decline of Sanskrit in India after the advent of Foreign rule and the establishment of our modern Universities paved the way for emergence of "Indologists" and their entry into the academic field. As a result, the traditional scholars were fast slipping into a secondary place — often as mere show-pieces, for occasions. The influence of Western savants and Indologists on the pursuit of advanced study of Sanskrit sources was exercised



through the medium of English language mainly. The succeeding generations of Sanskrit scholars and researchers who came out of the portals of the Universities and Colleges in the Nationalist period of Indian history had come under the powerful impact of the speeches and writings of Vivekananda who had thrown the full weight of his magnetic personality, eloquence and spiritual halo, heavily on the side of Advaita philosophy of Śaṅkara which he believed to be the highest reach of Vedantic thought. He has administered his own orientations to its traditional doctrines such as Māyā to make it more acceptable to the taste and temper of Western Rationalists. His diluted versions of Advaita and Māyāvāda were made more popular by academic writers brought up in that milieu. Before long it came to be seriously believed that "Vedānta" was synonymous with Advaita of Śaṅkara and that the two were convertible terms.

Whatever may have been in vogue in regard to the use of the terms Vedānta and Vedāntins in the earlier writings of the Buddhist, Jain, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other schools, and within the school of Śaṅkara himself *before* the rise and establishment of the Theistic Vedānta systems of Rāmānuja and Madhva, it is *now* no longer tenable, fair or permissible in the context of the present position of the three principal schools of Vedānta which have come to stay side by side, each with its own substantial output of literature and following.

It is hightime that our intellectuals and academicians who ought to know better desist from trying to perpetuate this illusion once and for all, in their speeches and writings.

In the infancy of Indian philosophical studies by modern scholars much capital had been sought to be made of a few random quotes from the Śrutis such as *Ekam sad viprā bahudhā vadanti*, *Ekam eva advitiyam*, *Tat tvam asi* and others, torn from their contexts. The Theistic schools of Rāmānuja and Madhva were quietly labelled as "Bhakti schools", "belonging more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of Indian thought." It is worth pondering what Rāmānuja says about *Tat tvam asi* not being the main proposition but an extension of the earlier pronouncement *Aitadātmyam idam sarvam* which opens up a new line of thinking.



The syllabus of post-graduate studies in Vedānta Śāstra in our Universities remains overweighted in favor of the Advaita philosophy with a meagre half-hearted provisions for the study of the other schools which are on a par with it.

Such a deplorable state of affairs in our temples of learning has victimised present-day studies of Indian philosophy in this country and in the West. It has led to a misplaced notion that non-Monistic systems of Vedānta are to be looked at askance as the outcome of religious prejudice and its interference with the pursuits of higher philosophy. Such unmerited denigration of the realistic systems has at times received overt and covert encouragement from various publicity media including at Government level.

All this is highly detrimental to the free and unfettered development of the pristine philosophical spirit of which this country has been the home and the cradle for thousands of years. The right way to end this imbalance and restore sanity of judgement is to mobilise enlightened public opinion among our intellectuals and the rising generations to extend complete parity, place and importance to all the different systems which have a living interest and following in the country.

May this Endowment for Lectures on the Dvaita School of Vedānta of Madhvācārya serve as the *Nāndi* for the earliest opening of a fullyfledged Department for Dvaita Teaching and Research in this very University.

Half a century of my life of eighty years has been devoted to the intensive study and research of the Dvaita school of Vedānta, its history, literature and philosophy. I have had to contend with many obstacles in my efforts to make the results of my studies available to modern minds interested in the subject in and outside India through standard works written and published in English, to ensure widest publicity to them. These have paved the way for correcting the imbalance which has been prevailing in our academic circles in respect of the study of the principal schools of Vedānta.

I am happy to see now that a permanent Endowment has been made for a Lectureship on Dvaita philosophy as expounded



by Madhvācārya in my own Alma Mater by discerning patron of learning Sri Aroor Srinivas Rao. I am thankful to the university for inviting me to deliver the inaugural lectures under this Endowment. It adds to my pleasure to do so at the Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy. The illustrious philosopher-statesman had always taken a keen and kindly interest in my work and career for several years in the past, and I take this opportunity of offering my Śraddhānjalis to his memory.

Tamilnadu is entitled to take legitimate pride for having contributed sizeably to the development of the Dvaita school, over several centuries through the writings of numerous distinguished traditional Pandits of the Madhva community, which has been domiciled for the past several centuries in almost all the districts of Tamilnadu. This includes not only Gṛhastha Pandits but many illustrious Pithadhipathis of the Mathas which had established their centres and even their headquarters in various parts of Tamilnadu in the past. To name a few: Śrīpādarāja and his pupil Vyāsarāja Svāmin and his pupil Vijayīndra Tīrtha, his successor Sudhīndra, Rāghavendra at Kumbakonam, Raghūtama at Tirukkoyilur, Satyanātha at Viracholapuram, Satyabhinava at Nachiarkoil, Jagannātha Tīrtha at Kumbakonam and Sumatīndra at Srirangam, and Ramachandra Tīrtha at Vellore have made monumental contributions to the development of Dvaita philosophy and have exercised a benevolent influence on the social and cultural life of Tamilnadu; and their names are remembered with reverence to this day in Tamilnadu.

Coming to modern times, the earliest pioneering writers of the community to write on Madhva philosophy in English have hailed from Tamilnadu. Other top-ranking authors from the community, whose works have brought Madhva philosophy before the International Forum, during the last four or five decades have also been mostly from Tamilnadu.

It would therefore be in the fitness of things for the Government of Tamilnadu, and the Union Government in collaboration with the Madras University to open a separate Department for the teaching/research in Dvaita Vedānta Philosophy in this premier University of Tamilnadu. I look forward to the Endowment leading to such a happy consummation ere long.







